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ABSTRACT
The United States prides itself on freedom of speech and information. However, foreign adversaries have
weaponized these prized freedoms against the United States. The First Amendment, the Privacy Act, and other
U.S. laws designed to protect Americans’ civil liberties paradoxically constrain the United States’ ability to combat
information warfare by its enemies. This Article argues that the United States must reform laws and doctrine
concerning speech, information, and privacy to protect the democratic process and national security. By exploring
the example of the Russian threat to the U.S. electoral process, this Article will illustrate how foreign adversaries
wield the United States’ own laws against it. It will also explain how justifiable concerns with infringement on
civil liberties have hindered the United States’ response. The Article concludes with recommendations on how
courts, legislatures, and policymakers should balance First Amendment and privacy rights with national security
interests to combat information warfare.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States prides itself on freedom of speech and information.
However, Russia and other foreign actors have weaponized these freedoms
against the United States. Most famously, before the 2016 presidential
election, Russia used online sources disguised as news outlets to produce and
distribute fake news, targeting voters in swing states.1 Russia then interfered
in the 2018 midterm elections and is attempting to influence the 2020
Presidential election.2 Iran, North Korea, and China are also engaging in
coordinated campaigns aimed at spreading disinformation3 to alter political
discourse.4 The Islamic State, too, has successfully used social media to shape
public opinion and the narrative of its conflict with the United States.5
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), foreign-influenced
1

2

3

4

5

Philip M. Napoli, What If More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News
and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 76 (2018); Natasha Korecki, ‘Sustained and Ongoing’
Disinformation Assault Targets Dem Presidential Candidates, POLITICO (Feb. 20, 2019, 6:05 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/20/2020-candidates-social-media-attack-1176018.
Josh Gerstein, U.S. Brings First Charge for Meddling in 2018 Midterm Elections, POLITICO (Oct. 19, 2018,
2:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/19/first-criminal-case-filed-over-russianinterference-in-2018-midterms-916787.
Disinformation is false information that is deliberately and often covertly spread to influence public
opinion whereas misinformation is incorrect or misleading information that is inadvertently sent
that influences public opinion.
Press Release, Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence,
DNI Coats Statement on the Intelligence Community’s Response to Executive Order 13848 on
Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election (Dec.
21, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/1933-dni-coatsstatement-on-the-intelligence-community-s-response-to-executive-order-13848-on-imposing-certa
in-sanctions-in-the-event-of-foreign-interference-in-a-united-states-election; see also PRESIDENT
DONALD TRUMP, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 35
(2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-20170905.pdf [hereinafter NSS 2017] (citing China and Russia’s use of information against Americans
online); Alina Polyakova & Daniel Fried, Democratic Defense Against Disinformation 2.0, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, June 2019, at 2 (arguing that exposing disinformation campaigns is not enough to
combat them); Emily Birnbaum, Twitter Releases Archive of Iran, Russia-Linked Misinformation Campaigns,
THE HILL (June 13, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/448341-twitterreleases-archive-of-iran-russia-linked-misinformation-campaigns (reporting Twitter’s release of
archival tweets relating to Iran and Russia-linked misinformation campaigns); Arya Goel et al.,
Managing and Mitigating Foreign Election Interference, LAWFARE (July 21, 2019, 10:00 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/managing-and-mitigating-foreign-election-interference
(noting
that Russia has targeted 19 different countries and the activities of Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia).
William Marcellino et al., Monitoring Social Media: Lessons for Future Department of Defense Social Media
Analysis in Support of Information Operations, RAND CORP., at 15 (2017), https://www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR1742.html.
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operations like Russia’s include covert actions intended to “sow division in
our society, undermine confidence in [ ] democratic institutions, and
otherwise affect political sentiment and public discourse to achieve strategic
geopolitical objectives.”6 Indeed, Russia’s disinformation campaigns spurred
a national argument over the legitimacy of the U.S. electoral system and how
the United States should respond.7 The 2017 U.S. National Security
Strategy repeatedly notes that the threat of information warfare by Russia
and China is likely to continue and that the United States’ response has been
“tepid and fragmented.”8
One reason for this weak response is that U.S. laws and jurisprudence
protecting free speech and privacy were not designed for the technological
realities of today. Much First Amendment doctrine is premised on an
idealized public square containing a marketplace of ideas. The Supreme
Court has even called the Internet “the modern public square.”9 However,
this metaphor is inapt for today’s social media environment, where private
entities control the conditions in which speech is made and heard.
Moreover, many laws that prevent the U.S. Government from collecting
data on U.S. persons’ First Amendment activities far predate the Internet.10
Many of these laws were developed in the 1970s, in the context of fears of
U.S. Government overreach during the Cold War. They were intended to
legally and morally distinguish U.S. Government actions from the Soviets’,
who surveilled and propagandized their own people.11 These laws remain

6

7
8
9
10

11

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE
1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download [hereinafter CYBER DIGITAL
TASK FORCE REPORT].
Id.; see also NSS 2017, supra note 4, at 14, 34 (pointing to America’s competitors’ use of information
to attack American institutions and values).
NSS 2017, supra note 4, at 35.
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
This Article defines a U.S. person as “any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent
residence in the United States, and any corporation, partnership, or other organization organized
under the laws of the United States.” 22 U.S.C. § 6010 (2017).
For example, the Soviet Union engaged in disinformation campaigns against the United States
notably in the 1950s, focusing on the country’s systemic racism, and in the 1980s, claiming that
AIDS was created by American biological weapons experimentation. See Ashley Deeks et al.,
Addressing Russian Influence: What Can We Learn From U.S. Cold War Counter-Propaganda Efforts?,
LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/addressing-russian-influencewhat-can-we-learn-us-cold-war-counter-propaganda-efforts (detailing Soviet use of disinformation
campaigns to highlight or exaggerate problems in America); Seth G. Jones, Russian Meddling in the
United States: The Historical Context of the Mueller Report, CSIS (Mar. 27, 2019),
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critical to protect civil liberties and curtail abuses of government power.
However, the drafters of those laws could not foresee that, years later, Russia
would surveil Americans’ Internet data and weaponize it against the United
States, while the U.S. Government would be barred from accessing its own
people’s data to fight back.
An example from 2016 acutely illustrates how U.S. laws constrain the
country’s ability to combat information warfare. In 2016, the State
Department (“DOS”) proposed to identify social media influencers who were
spreading Kremlin messages and target them with counterarguments.12
However, the Privacy Act of 1974 restricts data collection related to the ways
Americans exercise their First Amendment rights. The proposed program
could not guarantee that it would not inadvertently collect American citizens’
data, and the DOS program did not fall under the Act’s law-enforcement
exceptions. State Department lawyers quashed the program, reasoning that
tweets, retweets, and comments implicate the collection of data related to the
ways Americans exercise their First Amendment rights. The State
Department lawyers thus reasoned that the First Amendment prohibited a
program that would have encouraged the First Amendment right to free
political debate by adding political speech to the marketplace of ideas.13
In this and other ways, the United States’ own laws tie its hands in its
fight against information warfare. For this reason, developing, updating, and
deconflicting the laws regulating information operations is a high

12

13

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-meddling-united-states-historical-context-mueller-report
(arguing that Russia engaged in attempts to influence U.S. elections during the Cold War). Also,
during this time period, the U.S. intelligence community frequently violated Americans’ civil
liberties, which eventually led to the formation of the Church Committee. See, e.g., Americo R.
Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806–07 (1989) (detailing congressional inquiries into
intelligence agencies that uncovered privacy infringements post-Watergate).
See Adam Entous et al., Kremlin Trolls Burned Across the Internet as Washington Debated Options, WASH.
POST (Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kremlin-trollsburned-across-the-internet-as-washington-debated-options/2017/12/23/e7b9dc92-e403-11e7-ab
50-621fe0588340_story.html (detailing the proposed CIA action of creating fake websites and
personas to fight back against Kremlin trolls).
Cf. Jamie Condliffe, The Week in Tech: Disinformation’s Huge Inaction Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 31,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/31/technology/facebook-disinformation-nancypelosi.html (“[L]awmakers worry about running afoul of the First Amendment . . . .”).
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government priority.14 This Article argues that the United States must
reform laws, doctrine, and policies to protect national security and the
democratic process. First Amendment jurisprudence and the Privacy Act, in
particular, pose substantial obstacles to a whole-of-government approach in
fighting the Russian disinformation campaign and information warfare more
broadly.
Fortunately, solutions to this critical First Amendment problem can be
found within First Amendment jurisprudence itself.15 The First Amendment
remains the paramount American constitutional freedom. The Article does
not argue that the First Amendment is outdated or should be changed.
Instead, the Article argues that the First Amendment must be reinterpreted
to continue to protect the values embedded within it. Free and fair elections
are the foundation of democratic governance. For this reason, courts give
primacy to political speech. Yet, the threat of information warfare now
requires reconceptualizing political speech for the Internet era to protect
American democracy. Judges, legislators, and policymakers must carefully
balance constitutional rights with national security concerns so as not to
infringe upon fundamental American freedoms.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I will outline how foreign
adversaries have waged information warfare against the United States, using
the example of Russian information operations targeting the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, the most widely-known example of information warfare
against the United States.16 Part II will explain how First Amendment
doctrine, the Privacy Act, and related laws constrain the United States’
ability to fight information warfare. The Article will argue that Supreme
Court doctrine involving the public square, counterspeech, and falsehoods is

14

15
16

U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 13
(2016), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD-Strategy-for-Operations-inthe-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf.
See Polyakova & Fried, supra note 4, at 3 (“Freedom of expression and US First Amendment
protections do not rob free societies of options.”).
NSS 2017, supra note 4, at 14, 34; Press Release, Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Office
of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Coats Statement on the Intelligence Community’s Response
to Executive Order 13848 on Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in
a United States Election (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/pressreleases/item/1933-dni-coats-statement-on-the-intelligence-community-s-response-to-executive-o
rder-13848-on-imposing-certain-sanctions-in-the-event-of-foreign-interference-in-a-united-stateselection.
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inadequate for the realities of online political discourse.17 It will further argue
that Cold War-era privacy laws now pose an enormous hurdle to the United
States’ ability to combat Russia’s information warfare. Part IV will outline
doctrinal, legislative, and policy solutions to enable the United States to fight
information warfare while preserving civil liberties. It will argue that current
Supreme Court precedent can be extended to protect the electoral process
and regulate foreign speech, and certain other speech, accordingly. The
Article will then propose legal reforms, legislation, and new policies to
combat three major tactics of election-related Russian information warfare:
paid advertisements, fake news, and divisive propaganda. It will also
evaluate past proposals for self-regulation by online platforms and social
media outlets.18 Finally, the Article will conclude by discussing the
implications of this analysis for the United States’ fight against information
warfare and the appropriate balance between civil liberties and national
security more generally.
This Article will discuss how the United States can combat information
warfare through a whole-of-government approach, with a focus on civilian
government agencies. A thorough discussion of U.S. military operations
concerning information warfare involves additional legal authorities,
including classified information, and lies beyond the scope of this paper.19
However, the framework in this Article is relevant for employing and
combatting information operations. Information operations are increasingly
used by the U.S. military and its adversaries both during and outside the
sphere of armed conflict. U.S. military information operations and
surveillance activities—especially when the military operates in cooperation

17

18

19

This Article considers social media companies as “information content provider[s]” because of their
partial responsibility for the “creation or development of information provided through the Internet
. . . .” Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2017). The Communications
Decency Act was Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, §§ 50161, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as amended in sections of 47 U.S.C.).
Following common practice by courts and legislatures, this Article defines “online platform” as “any
public-facing Internet Web site, Web application, or digital application, including a social network
or publication, that has 10,000,000 or more unique monthly United States visitors or users for a
majority of months during the preceding 12 months.” Some courts and statutes have reduced the
number of users required to meet this definition. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17940(c) (2018).
For additional legal authorities relevant to the military’s response to information warfare, see
generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUB. 3-12, CYBERSPACE
OPERATIONS (June 8, 2018) (providing “joint doctrine to plan, execute, and assess cyberspace
operations”).

88

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:1

with civilian agencies—must comply with the same constitutional principles
discussed in this Article and would employ similar tools to combat
misinformation and propaganda campaigns.
I. HOW INFORMATION WARFARE WEAPONIZES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Information Warfare Threat: The 2016 Russian Disinformation Campaign
Unable to match the United States in conventional warfare, its enemies
have turned to stealthier and less costly disinformation campaigns.20 Russia
engaged in a multi-year, coordinated disinformation effort through its statesponsored Internet Research Agency (“IRA”). The campaign’s goal was to
exert political influence and exacerbate social divisions within the United
States.21 Russian information warfare adopts a guerrilla or “firehose of

20

21

YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND
RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 24 (2018) (defining misinformation as “publishing
wrong information without meaning to be wrong or having a political purpose in communicating
false information” and disinformation as “manipulating and misleading people intentionally to
achieve political ends”).
NEW KNOWLEDGE, THE TACTICS & TROPES OF THE INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY 4 (2018),
https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformation-report/NewKnowledge-Disi
nformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT]; see also BENKLER
ET AL., supra note 20, at 237 (noting the origins of Russian state-sponsored information campaigns
against opponents). While this Article cites the New Knowledge Report, it is important to recognize
that those concerned about foreign disinformation campaigns are not impervious to conducting
their own. The chief executive of New Knowledge, Jonathon Moore, was reportedly involved in a
project that engaged in deceptive tactics in the Alabama Senate race between Doug Jones and Roy
S. Moore. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama Senate Race Imitated Russian
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/alabama-senateroy-jones-russia.html. The project involved operators “pos[ing] as conservative Alabamians, using
it to try to divide Republicans” and engaging in false-flag operations. Morgan claimed that the
project was an “experiment” and not designed “to affect the election.” Id. Whether or not that is
true, it is clear that Americans may seek to engage in disinformation tactics. See Emily Birnbaum
& Olivia Beavers, Americans Mimic Russian Disinformation Tactics Ahead of 2020, HILL (May 8, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/442620-americans-mimic-russian-disinforma
tion-tactics-ahead-of-2020 (reporting “both right-wing and liberal trolls engage in disinformation
campaigns designed to undermine 2020 presidential candidates”); Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology
202: Disinformation Spread by Americans is ‘the Hardest Challenge That We Have,’ DHS Official Says, WASH.
POST (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/thetechnology-202/2019/04/12/the-technology-202-disinformation-spread-by-americans-is-the-har
dest-challenge-that-we-have-dhs-official-says/5caf9cf91ad2e567949ec16c/?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.64331b7d0203 (describing disinformation spread by Americans as the hardest challenge
government faces).
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falsehood” approach,22 called the Gerasimov Doctrine. The Doctrine
proposes that Russia can defeat its enemies through a “combination of
political, economic, informational, technological, and ecological
campaigns.”23 The Doctrine advocates using non-military tactics over
conventional warfare to achieve political and strategic goals.24 Three
distinctive features characterize the model: (1) engaging in a high number of
platforms, (2) producing rapid, continuous, repetitive floods of messaging,
and (3) disseminating partial truths or outright lies, whether or not they are
consistent with one another.25 Russia’s disinformation campaign functions
by trying thousands of tactics until one succeeds.
The Gerasimov Doctrine’s foundations play on human psychology. First
impressions are incredibly resilient: an individual is more likely to accept and
favor the first information she receives on a topic when encountering
conflicting messages.26 Research demonstrates that people are likely to
remember information, or how they feel about that information, but forget
the context in which they learned it.27 If a user receives misinformation first,
she is likely to believe that misinformation, even if she encounters the true
information later. Also, receiving a message from multiple media types and
multiple sources increases its perceived credibility. This repetitive feature of
the Russian “firehose” model breeds familiarity, which leads to acceptance.28
Termed the illusory truth effect, people “rate statements as more truthful,
valid, and believable when they have encountered those statements

22

23

24

25
26
27

28

Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why it
Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND CORP. 1 (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
perspectives/PE198.html.
Peter Pomerantsev, Inside the Kremlin’s Hall of Mirrors, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2015, 1:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information
-psychology.
Valery Gerasimov, Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country, MIL. REV.
(Harold Orenstein trans., Nov.–Dec. 2017), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/
7/military-review/Archives/English/Contemporary-Warfare-and-Current-Issues-for-the-Defens
e-of-the-Country.pdf.; Ben Sohl, Influence Campaigns and the Future of International Competition,
REALCLEAR DEFENSE (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/
2017/09/12/influence_campaigns_and_international_competition_112280.html.
Paul & Matthews, supra note 22, at 1.
Id. at 4.
David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News, 359 SCIENCE 1094, 1095 (2018),
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/359/6380/1094/full/pdf.http://science.sciencemag.
org/content/sci/359/6380/1094.full.pdf.
Paul & Matthews, supra note 22, at 4.
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previously than when they are new statements.”29 Thus, many Americans
are susceptible to Russian tactics, which exploit psychological tendencies.
The IRA intended to polarize and divide the American electorate and to
normalize viewpoints that were strategically advantageous to Russia. The
FBI, CIA, and NSA commissioned the Intelligence Community Assessment
(“ICA”), a 2017 report to assess Russian activities and intentions in the 2016
election.30 The report explained that Russian influence campaigns are
“multifaceted and designed to be deniable because they use a mix of agents
of influence, cutouts, front organizations, and false-flag operations.”31 The
influence campaign leading up to the 2016 presidential election blended
covert intelligence operations with overt efforts “by Russian Government
agencies, state-funded media, [and] third-party intermediaries. . . .”32 Paid
trolls also spread propaganda on social media, and in online chat rooms,
discussion forums, and website comment sections.33 These propagandists
maintained thousands of fake accounts on online platforms like Twitter and
Facebook.34 Instagram, in particular, was a target and will continue to be a
target as many young social media users use the platform.35 Instagram’s
recommendation algorithm, hashtagging, and sharing stories function made
it “the most effective platform for the [IRA].”36
The Russian effort flooded the Internet, especially social media, with
disinformation. According to a report commissioned by the Senate
29
30

31
32
33
34

35

36

Id.
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS”: THE ANALYTIC PROCESS
AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION, (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. [hereinafter ICA].
Id. at 2.
Id. at ii.
Id. at 2.
Dmitry Volchek & Daisy Sindelar, One Professional Russian Troll Tells All, RADIO FREE EUR.: RADIO
LIBERTY (Mar. 25, 2015, 11:08 GMT), https://www.rferl.org/a/how-to-guide-russian-trollingtrolls/26919999.html (discussing a “troll factory” and the assignments given to those who worked
there).
Taylor Lorenz, Instagram is the Internet’s New Home for Hate, ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/instagram-is-the-internets-newhome-for-hate/585382/ (noting that users of Instagram, which is “teeming with [ ] conspiracy
theories, viral misinformation and extremist memes,” are very young); see also Paris Martineau, How
Instagram Became the Russian IRA’s Go-To Social Network, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2018, 1:13 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/how-instagram-became-russian-iras-social-network/ (detailing the
success of the IRA’s efforts on Instagram).
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 26.
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Intelligence Committee,37 the IRA’s operations from 2013 to 2018 reached
126 million Facebook users, 20 million Instagram users,38 and 1.4 million
Twitter users. The IRA uploaded one thousand videos on YouTube as
well.39 Between 2015 and 2017, over 30 million users shared Facebook and
Instagram posts generated by the IRA.40
The Russian disinformation campaign involved at least three major
tactics: (1) paid advertisements, (2) fake news, especially false news stories
about political candidates, and (3) what we term “divisive propaganda,”41
which may involve false news stories about other topics or other information
operations designed to sow discord in American society. For example, the
IRA ran polarizing advertisements on dozens of proxy news sites that
disguised or downplayed their affiliation with Russia.42 IRA accounts were
registered at various IP addresses so they could pass for accounts of different
nationalities. These advertisements targeted all parts of the political
spectrum and reached, at least, hundreds of thousands of Americans.43 One
37

38
39
40
41

42

43

PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA RESEARCH PROJECT: THE IRA,
SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE U.S., 2012-2018, at 6 (2018),
https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2018/12/IRA-Report.pdf
[hereinafter OXFORD REPORT].
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 33.
Id. at 6.
OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 3; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 242.
This Article uses the definition of “propaganda” in the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 611(j) (1942), amended by Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691. The
Act defines “political propaganda” to include:
any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any
person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same
believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any
other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with
reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a
foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the
United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2)
which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious
disorder, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other
American republic or the overthrow of any government or political subdivision of any
other American republic by any means involving the use of force or violence.
Definitions of propaganda are not consistent in U.S. laws.
Paul & Matthews, supra note 25, at 2 (“[T]here are dozens of proxy news sites presenting Russian
propaganda, but with their affiliation with Russia disguised or downplayed”); see also BENKLER ET
AL., supra note 20, at 368 (discussing Russia’s use of behavioral marketing techniques to influence
public opinion).
Cecilia Kang et al., Russia-Financed Ad Linked Clinton and Satan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/us/politics/facebook-google-twitter-russian-interference
-hearings.html (noting that Facebook had stated that “an estimated 150 million users of its main
site and its subsidiary, Instagram, were exposed” to these advertisements).
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of the earlier instances of fake news produced by the Russian disinformation
campaign was the September 2014 #ColumbianChemicals hoax.44 The
campaign, waged by thousands of Russian troll and bot accounts,45 centered
on an invented explosion at the Columbian Chemicals plant in Louisiana.
Related disinformation spread across Twitter, Facebook, and Wikipedia,
backed by digitally altered graphics and pictures.46 Russia also disseminated
fake news claiming that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS.47
The majority of the Russian disinformation campaign involved divisive
propaganda. These efforts were designed to sow discord in American
society, using speech that was sometimes true and sometimes false. For
example, IRA efforts on Facebook and Instagram were designed to reinforce
themes and messages to clearly-identified audiences, such as the political
Left, Right, and African-American communities.48 Twitter accounts
provided “largely opportunistic real-time chatter” and were part of a crossplatform building tactic, linking platform pages with Twitter accounts.49
Facebook and Instagram were “used to develop deeper relationships” with
targeted audiences, building pages “dedicated to continual reinforcement of
in-group and out-group ideals.”50 More than one hundred Twitter accounts
went as far as to impersonate state and local news enterprises.51 On
Facebook, the five most-shared and the five most-liked posts focused on gun

44

45

46

47

48
49
50
51

Todd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe,
RAND CORP. 19 (2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/
RR2200/RR2237/RAND_RR2237.pdf (recounting the Columbian Chemicals plant explosion
hoax).
This Article defines “bot” as an “automated online account where all or substantially all of the
actions or posts of that account are not the result of a person.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17940(a)
(2018).
Helmus et al., supra note 44, at 18; see also OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 26–27 (describing
the Columbian Chemical hoax); Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html (discussing generally the
propaganda the IRA posted online under fake identities).
See ICA, supra note 30, at 4 (noting an interview with Julian Assange titled Clinton and ISIS Funded by
the Same Money); NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 60, 84 (noting that content on rightleaning Internet pages included statements that Hillary Clinton founded ISIS); Max Boot, Opinion,
Without the Russians, Trump Wouldn’t Have Won, WASH. POST (July 24, 2018, 6:36 PM),
https://beta.washingtonpost.com/opinions/without-the-russians-trump-wouldnt-have-won/2018
/07/24/f4c87894-8f6b-11e8-bcd5-9d911c784c38_story.html.
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 66.
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ownership, police violence against African-Americans, and anti-immigrant
sentiment.52 Other divisive posts pitted immigrants against veterans and
featured messages that were anti-Muslim and anti-President Obama.53 From
2015 to 2016, much of the divisive messaging sought to benefit thenpresidential candidate Donald Trump.54
Leading up to the election, the IRA varied its content according to the
targeted group. The Agency’s messaging was not always “objectively false,”
and although it may have been offensive, most of it did not qualify as “hate
speech.”55 IRA messaging encouraged right-wing groups to support
Trump’s campaign and to generate anger towards and suspicion of the
Left.56 IRA messaging repeated patriotic and anti-immigrant slogans and
attempted to incite outrage about liberal appeasement of ‘others’ at the
expense of U.S. citizens.57 For example, posted content discussed voter fraud
and gave warnings on how the election might be stolen.58 This messaging
directly encouraged votes for Trump.
The IRA acted specifically to suppress votes of those likely to vote against
Trump. Left-wing groups and Black Americans, who were expected to vote
against Trump, received messaging designed to discourage, confuse, or
distract them from voting.59 The IRA advanced three major variants of voter
suppression tactics: “malicious misdirection,” designed to create confusion
over voter rules; “candidate support redirection,” designed to change voting

52
53
54
55

56

57
58
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OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 7.
Id.
ICA, supra note 30, at 1 (“We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear
preference for President-elect Trump.”).
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 99. Building consensus in the legal community on
a definition for hate speech is unavailing. See generally Andrew F. Sellars, Defining Hate Speech 24–31
(Berkman Klein Center, Working Paper No. 2016-20, 2016) (attempting to define hate speech by
drawing out eight common traits of hate speech definitions).
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 83; see also BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 236
(“Just as terrorism succeeds most when it evokes an overreaction and causes a society to respond
from fear and anger rather than calculation, so too will Russian active measures have their largest
effect through evoking a harmful autoimmune response from the countries under attack.”). The
“Left” here is used colloquially to refer to liberals and Democrats, as opposed to moderates,
conservatives, or Republicans.
OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 19.
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 81 (describing voter suppression tactics employed by
the IRA in the days leading up to the election).
OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 19; BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 240 (“The core strategy
. . . was to increase disaffection, distrust, and polarization in American politics.”).
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patterns; and “turnout depression.”60 To illustrate, the IRA advanced the
message that voters should boycott the election because the candidates do
not care about Black people.61 The messaging preyed on societal anger with
structural inequalities, police violence, and disproportionate levels of
incarceration.62 When it came to messaging directed at the Left, the IRA
sought to promote anti-establishment views and redirect candidate support63
by using messaging designed to reduce trust in the political system.64 IRA
content also adopted specific political stances, mentioning Trump and
Clinton by name.65 The ICA concluded—with high confidence—that
Russia’s goals were to undermine the U.S. democratic process and harm
Hillary Clinton’s electability and potential presidency.66
The IRA’s campaigns did not stop with the 2016 election or even when
the U.S. intelligence community caught them. To the contrary, engagement
rates increased and covered a broader range of public policy and national
security issues, along with social issues relevant to younger voters.67 The ICA
warned that Russia and other foreign adversaries are likely to expand on
these tactics to meddle in future elections and further polarize American
society.68 FBI Director Chris Wray declared in July 2018 that “malign
influence operations” by Russia and others are actively underway.69 Russia’s
defense minister has also announced plans to expand its information warfare
capability.70

60
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64
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67
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NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 8.
OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 3.
Id. at 19.
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 83 (noting that left-targeted content focused on
identity and pride, and encouraged voting for candidates other than Clinton).
OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 (describing messaging to LGBT and liberal voters as seeking
to reduce trust in the political system).
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 76 (stating that approximately 6% of tweets, 18% of
Instagram posts, and 7% of Facebook posts mentioned the candidates by name).
ICA, supra note 30, at 1.
OXFORD REPORT, supra note 37, at 3.
Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 273–74 (2018) (citing ICA,
supra note 30, at 5).
Connor O’Brien, FBI Director: Russia ‘Continues to Engage in Malign Influence Operations’ Against U.S.,
POLITICO (July 18, 2018, 9:50 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/18/fbi-wrayrussia-meddling-732337.
See Vladimir Isachenkov, Russia Military Acknowledges New Branch: Info Warfare Troops, AP NEWS (Feb.
22, 2017), https://apnews.com/8b7532462dd0495d9f756c9ae7d2ff3c/russian-military-continuesmassive-upgrade (discussing “information warfare troops,” Russia’s new branch of the military).
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Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to assess his department’s
capability to engage with social media and publicly available information in
May 2016, which was too late to stop Russian interference in the presidential
election.71 The precise impact of these disinformation campaigns on
elections is hard to measure, which may have made some government actors
reluctant to devote resources to stop them. However, the campaigns have
undoubtedly succeeded in sowing dissension in American society, creating
protests over fake issues online.72 Regardless of whether they changed the
outcome of any given election, the United States must stop its adversaries
from weaponizing American freedoms to cause dissension and violence
within its borders.
Any legislation or regulatory oversight relating to social media will clash
with U.S. doctrine on free speech. The United States’ commitment to free
speech and privacy creates an asymmetric disadvantage against Russia and
other adversaries who routinely engage in censorship, manipulation, and
suppression of ideas.73 The New Knowledge Report highlights that “[o]ur
deeply-felt national scruples about misidentifying a fake account or
inadvertently silencing someone, however briefly, create a welcoming
environment for malign groups who masquerade as Americans or who game
algorithms.”74 To combat Russian threats to the U.S. democratic process—
and to social order more generally—the United States must confront how its
domestic law constrains its ability to fight information warfare. Stronger
rules and norms are also needed to prevent the use of social media and new
information technologies to manipulate U.S. elections.75
II. HOW U.S. LAW TIES U.S. HANDS
First Amendment freedoms create an environment ripe for Russia’s
disinformation campaigns. As Eric Posner explains, the “First Amendment
71

72
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74
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H.R. REP. NO. 114-537, at 91, 246–47 (2016) (acknowledging that the Department of Defense
lacked sufficient capacity and directive to address information warfare and directing the
Department to assess and address the issue).
See e.g., Claire Allbright, A Russian Facebook Page Organized A Protest in Texas. A Different Russian Page
Launched the Counterprotest., TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/11/01/russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/.
Id.
NEW KNOWLEDGE REPORT, supra note 21, at 100.
Id. (noting that more investigation needs to be done to understand and address information warfare
threats to U.S. elections).
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protects propagandists whom U.S. authorities could reach, and national
borders protect propagandists whom the First Amendment does not
protect.”76 In short, the First Amendment gives the highest protection to
political speech, which, under Supreme Court precedent, applies to many
Russian disinformation efforts. The First Amendment also protects
falsehoods, and caselaw suggests this would include much Russian fake
news.77 Counterspeech, the presumptive remedy to false speech, is limited
in its utility. The Supreme Court’s doctrine on incitement, one of the few
areas of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment, likely does not
extend to Russian disinformation campaigns in its current form. Concerns
with surveillance infringing on privacy and chilling speech also inhibit the
U.S. Government’s ability to respond to Russian disinformation campaigns.
Any legislation that would allow the United States to combat information
warfare must overcome these hurdles.
A. The New Private Public Square
Many of the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on freedoms of speech and
the press were decided before the advent of the Internet, social media, and
big data. Therefore, the factual assumptions of those cases do not transplant
perfectly onto today’s social media environment. When the Internet made it
far easier to extend the reach of disinformation beyond a country’s borders,
it fundamentally altered the scope of the First Amendment. The law remains
stagnant. The Supreme Court has tried to graft the metaphor of the public
square, the paradigmatic venue for the exchange of free speech and ideas,
onto the Internet context. However, the Supreme Court’s analysis suffers
from several critical flaws, including the failure to distinguish social media
from the Internet at large, the failure to distinguish social media from
traditional media, and the limits of counterspeech.
1. Social Media Is Not the Internet, and Neither Is the Public Square
Supreme Court jurisprudence lumps the Internet together with social
media as part of the “new public square.” The first Internet-related case
resolved in the Supreme Court was Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, in
76
77

Eric Posner, Are Russian Trolls Protected by the First Amendment?, ERIC POSNER (Feb. 17, 2018),
http://ericposner.com/are-russian-trolls-protected-by-the-first-amendment/.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
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which the Court established that online speech does not receive a lesser
degree of First Amendment protection than other speech.78 In Reno, the
ACLU sued the U.S. Attorney General, claiming that two provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) violated the First
Amendment.79 The provisions criminalized the “knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent” messages to minors, and “knowing, sending, or
displaying of patently offensive messages” to minors that contain “sexual or
excretory activities or organs.”80 The Supreme Court held that “the blanket
provisions were an impermissible infringement on free speech rights.”81 The
provisions “were content-based restrictions because they regulated the
subject matter and type of speech,” and therefore were subject to strict
scrutiny.82 The Court found the content-based restrictions to be overbroad
and vague, as “indecent” and “obscene” were not defined.83 Although Reno
did not specifically involve social media websites, courts later relied on this
case when extending First Amendment protection to social media.
In the early 2010s, district courts extended Reno to find that the First
Amendment protects a wall post84 and “liking” a political candidate’s

78

79
80

81

82
83
84

521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].”); see also Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263,
272 (4th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the Internet standard presented in Reno).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 861.
Id. at 859–60. The first provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), “prohibits the knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age.” Id. at 859. The second
provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(d), “prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive
messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age.” Id.
Katherine A. Ferry, Comment, Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Social Media”
As Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 717, 743 (2018); see also Reno, 521 U.S.
at 868 (noting that the CDA is a “content-based blanket restriction on speech”); Andrew H.
Montroll, Note, Students’ Free Speech Rights in Public Schools: Content-Based Versus Public Forum Restrictions,
13 VT. L. REV. 493, 500 (1989) (describing the Supreme Court’s traditionally strict approach to
content-based speech restrictions).
See Blum et al., Tests to be Applied to Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations, 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 480 (2017) (describing the analysis concerning content-based restrictions).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 877–79.
See Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215(JLH), 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011)
(holding that a public employee’s Facebook post was protected under the First Amendment);
Gresham v. City of Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601020 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011)
adhered to on reconsideration, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2012 WL 1600439 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2012) and
aff’d, 542 F. App’x 817 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the plaintiff’s Facebook post was entitled
to First Amendment protection).
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Facebook page.85 In the 2017 case of Packingham v. North Carolina, the first
Supreme Court case to address social media, the Court struck down a North
Carolina statute that prohibited sex offenders from accessing social media
sites.86 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, famously characterized the
Internet as “the new public square.”87 Kennedy noted that 70% of American
adults were then using at least one social media site, and Facebook’s
membership—the particular site at issue—was three times the size of North
America’s population.88 While the Court likened the Internet to the public
square, the worldwide reach of the Internet has outgrown any physical public
square in its role as a channel for expression.89 The Court explained that
social media websites:
can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private
citizen to make his or her voice heard. They allow a person with an Internet
connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than
it could from any soapbox.’ In sum, to foreclose access to social media
altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of
First Amendment rights.90

This reasoning underscores the role of social media as a public forum for
speech.
The Court recognized that legislatures could limit First Amendment
protection for sex offenders using narrowly tailored statutes. However, it
found that the statute at issue, though content-neutral, burdened more
speech than was necessary to advance the government’s interest in protecting
vulnerable victims from dangerous predators.91 Thus, North Carolina did
not meet its burden of showing that a sweeping law barring access to social
media sites is necessary or legitimate to serve the stated purpose of keeping
sex offenders away from vulnerable victims.

85
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Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386, 394 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that “liking” a Facebook page is
speech protected by the First Amendment but remanding on other grounds).
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Id. at 1737 (describing the Internet as “the modern public square”).
Id. at 1735; see also Facebook, Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/
company-info/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (noting that there were “1.59 billion daily active users on
Facebook on average for June 2019”); Jessica Guynn, Facebook Now Averages 8 Billion Daily Video Views,
USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2015, 8:10 PM), http://usat.ly/2huc6St (“Facebook says it now averages 8
billion daily views from 500 million users.”).
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (referring to the Internet as the “modern public square”).
Id. at 1737 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
Id. at 1737–38.
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Packingham thus clarifies that the same First Amendment standards that
protect the actual public square also protect social media sites. As discussed
below, political speech has traditionally received the highest constitutional
protections within the public square. Presuming that foreign propaganda
qualifies as protected political speech, foreign disinformation campaigns may
then receive the highest level of First Amendment protections.
2. The Realities of the Public Square
The realities of the old public square, however, are quite different from
those of the “new” one. The Internet may be a public zone of sorts because
of the ability of any user to post and receive information on publicly available
sites. Nevertheless, social media serves as the battleground for information
campaigns precisely because of attributes that distinguish it from the
idealized public square of pre-Internet First Amendment jurisprudence.
Moreover, courts have treated “the Internet” as a monolith in their decisions,
lumping social media sites together with search engines and Internet
retailers. In the context of free speech and political debate, different types of
Internet sites present distinct constitutional issues that are critical for
combatting information warfare.92
Two common types of Internet sites—search engines and social media—
present different legal issues related to the First Amendment and privacy.
The way users interface with the Google search engine is entirely different
from the way users interact with one another on social media. Users of a
search engine are presented with the product of search results. A search
engine company’s responsibility to its users is to provide the most relevant
results, and to distinguish for its users those companies who have paid for
their results to be advertised. The data that users enter into a search engine
is information for which they wish to search, not necessarily personal data
about themselves, their family, or their relationships.93 Social media sites, by
contrast, require more personal user interaction. Users enter personal
information on a profile and connect with friends or other contacts. They
communicate with each other through the site, post and share information,
and comment on that information. Most social media sites do not generate
92
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The authors acknowledge that, in some contexts, it may be appropriate for the Court to treat social
media and other Internet sites similarly. However, we argue that social media presents some unique
constitutional issues in the context of political speech and information warfare.
We recognize, however, that questions or topics searched can certainly be revealing of one’s
personal circumstances and other information.
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news items on their own, but they allow users to create and share content
using the websites as platforms. Social media companies may agree to keep
users’ data private or publicly available on the Internet. These companies
profit from advertisers who target potential customers with user data. Unlike
search engines, social media companies do not only provide information;
they provide users an experience and advertisers a platform to sell their
products.
Perhaps most importantly, private companies govern social media. U.S.
persons do not have the same negative rights against private companies as
they do against the government. Private companies exist for profit and have
the right to accept money for advertising and post-boosting by paid
companies without restrictions. Social media companies do exercise a type
of governance over the online communities that they have created.94
Although not all social media sites have as intricate a communal structure as
Facebook, they all have terms of service that amount to contracts of adhesion
between the companies and their users. However, social media users do not
benefit from constitutional protections against their social media
“government.” Social media companies may engage in data mining that
would likely constitute search, seizure, or surveillance and face regulation if
done by the U.S. Government.
While social media sites are important venues for discourse and
expression, social media differs drastically from the public square. Public
squares are sites for human interaction. Visitors to a public square can see
who enters and exits, and be sure that they are real people. Visitors can more
easily filter out real news sources from fake news sources when interacting
with real people. They can see the human source of the news, can directly
and instantaneously ask questions about the legitimacy of the source and
content, and can better determine the veracity of the information given to
them. There is a limit to the amount of information that a person can receive
in a public square in a short period. Public squares do not usually have echo
chambers that facilitate the repetition of false messages. The capacity to
enter a public square and speak in it rarely depends upon whether a State
sponsors a speaker or whether one speaker can pay to promote posts more

94

See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (describing the social media platform’s regulation of speech as
“governance”).
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than others. Speech is not spoken or heard on social media the way it is in a
public square, since a post may be seen and shared long after it is originally
“spoken.”95
Social media is particularly vulnerable to influence and disinformation
campaigns in ways that the public square is not. Social media was designed
to open unfiltered, personalized channels of communication. It does not
possess the filters and vetting systems of traditional news media to process
what is true and what is false.96 Thus, the platforms enable false information
to spread widely and quickly.97 Social networks amplify the reach and
effectiveness of sensational stories, including those from foreign speakers
acting to influence U.S. political conversations. Precise, targeted advertising
capabilities magnify the effect of those wishing to spread disinformation on
social media.98 In 2016, divisive propaganda campaigns delivering targeted
messaging to Right, Left, and African-American communities were made
more effective by the echo chambers inherent in social media. Further,
sharing functions and the wide breadth of the campaign improved the reach
of disinformation to members of the targeted communities.
Thus, social media is not a public square and should not be legally treated
as such. As Justice Kennedy recognized in Packingham, the Internet has
increased the size of the public square far beyond what the builders of any
physical public square ever conceived. Yet the Supreme Court has failed to
recognize the implications of that infinite expansion for the usefulness of this
hallowed metaphor. Social media is only one part of the Internet, and both
social media and the Internet are distinct from the idealized public square
assumed in free speech jurisprudence. Distinguishing between the roles that
the Internet and social media play as fora for political speech is critical to
creating distinctly tailored constitutional laws and regulations to protect the
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John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement
Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 428 (2002) (noting that “the vast majority of Internet
communications . . . are usually ‘heard’ well after they are ‘spoken’”). As of November 2019,
Cronan is the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ Criminal Division.
See Samantha Power, Opinion, Samantha Power: Why Foreign Propaganda Is More Dangerous Now, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/opinion/samantha-powerpropaganda-fake-news.html (discussing the risk of foreign influence online).
See David M. Howard, Can Democracy Withstand the Cyber Age: 1984 in the 21st Century, 69 HASTINGS
L.J. 1355, 1371 (2018) (noting the prevalence of disinformation in the media and its impact on the
role social media plays).
See Thai, supra note 68, at 307 (“[T]he voluntary clustering of politically likeminded individuals and
the application of sophisticated ad targeting, can greatly amplify the reach . . . of a sensational story
from a foreign speaker seeking to influence the domestic political marketplace.”).
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integrity of the electoral process. The metaphor of the “public square” may
have been more apt for the Internet early in its history. Today, social media
places political discourse under private control and creates an environment
ripe for exploitation.
3. Virtual Media is not Traditional Media
Scholars and courts frequently apply a First Amendment framework
based on traditional media to the Internet and social media. However,
important distinctions might justify different treatment under First
Amendment doctrine. As discussed above, social media and the Internet are
susceptible to disinformation campaigns in ways that traditional media are
not.
Scholar Alan Chen has identified three distinctive features of the Internet
compared to other media: broad and instantaneous amplification of
information, relatively inexpensive cost, and elements of anonymity.99 When
extending existing First Amendment doctrine to social media, courts might
wish to distinguish it on these grounds. The fact that the Internet is faster
and cheaper at disseminating information is less likely to be a distinguishing
factor; telecommunications have only gotten faster and less expensive over
time, with little change to First Amendment jurisprudence as a result. The
features of anonymity that the Internet provides drastically change the
speaker-audience relationship envisioned in prior First Amendment
jurisprudence such that this criterion might be fertile ground for
distinguishing the Internet. The ability of a speaker to remain anonymous
complicates the question of attribution for speech. Previously, the audience
who heard someone shouting “fire” in a crowded theater could look at the
speaker and make some judgment as to her credibility to sound such an
alarm. On the Internet, a decent graphic designer or video editor can
provide a veneer of credibility that would be more difficult for humans to
match than in person. Traditional media also involves an important layer of
professional editorial review for content that is mostly absent on social media.
To the extent that social media companies approve advertisements, they are
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Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 379, 391 (2017).
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not subject to the same degree of regulation as law requires for
advertisements on broadcast media.100
Unlike previous content distributors (e.g., book distributors) and
traditional media, social media platforms do little, if anything, to curate the
sources and content disseminated on their platforms.101 Professional rules of
conduct and ethical norms bind traditional news outlets and journalists on
media platforms. These traditional outlets involve a layer of editorial
oversight, often including fact-checking, before publishing a story. Social
media contains no such checks for professionalism, ethics, or veracity. The
social media user alone bears the burden to distinguish between fake and
legitimate news.102 As discussed below, most consumers are not able to
distinguish the sources and determine the legitimacy of the news.
In some circumstances, the lines between online media and regular media
blur. Traditional media sites like the New York Times, for example, also have
websites and interactive functions, and traditional First Amendment
interpretations may still be adequate for these sites. However, in the context
of information warfare, the failure of courts and commentators to recognize
distinctions between online and traditional media is problematic. In this
context, traditional media and online media function differently, and social
media functions differently from much other Internet media—and vastly
different from the public square. Any effective laws to fight information
warfare must account for these important distinctions. Even more
importantly, courts must interpret such laws based on appropriate,
empirically-based assumptions.
4. The Limits of Counterspeech
Much of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence is based on the doctrine
of counterspeech. The counterspeech doctrine proposes that more true
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For example, Federal Election Commission rules regarding advertising and disclosure that apply to
traditional media do not apply to social media. See, e.g., Advertising and Disclaimers, FED. ELECTION
COMMISSION, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/
advertising/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). The Honest Ads Act aimed to close some of these loopholes
but was not passed by Congress. See Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
Napoli, supra note 1, at 85.
See id. (noting that the “relatively limited ability” of social media platforms “to distinguish between
fake and legitimate news stories/sources” has been transferred to the media consumer).
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speech will drown out false speech in the Millian marketplace of ideas: a free
and competitive speech environment with limited government
interference.103 The doctrine was most famously articulated in Supreme
Court jurisprudence by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California in 1927.104 In
concurrence, Brandeis wrote, “If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”105 For Brandeis,
the solution to false speech is to counter it with more speech. True and false
speech will compete in the marketplace of ideas until the truth prevails.106
Accordingly, counterspeech is often proposed as a solution to respond to
falsity in political campaign communications.107 Yet the counterspeech
doctrine rests on several major assumptions that may not be true in any
context and are especially mistaken in the social media context. First, it
assumes that individuals can distinguish between true and false
information.108 Second, it assumes participants value true information more
than false information.109 Scientific studies cast doubt on both of these
assumptions.110 These studies show that people usually accept information
uncritically. They do not usually question the information’s credibility unless
it challenges their existing assumptions, or they have incentives to do so.
103

104
105
106

107
108

109
110

See Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of ldeas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 1167
(2015) (observing that Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney v. California is a “canonical
formulation” of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution.”).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id.
See Alexandra Andorfer, Note, Spreading like Wildfire: Solutions for Abating the Fake News Problem on Social
Media via Technology Controls and Government Regulation, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1409, 1422 (2018) (noting
Justice Holmes’s idea that “true speech should compete with falsehoods in the ‘marketplace of ideas’
until the truth eventually wins”).
See Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 832 (Wash. 2007) (“[T]he best remedy for
false or unpleasant speech is more speech, not less speech.”).
See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (noting that counterspeech assumes that audiences can “rationally assess[]
the truth, quality, and credibility” of speech).
Napoli, supra note 1, at 61 (citation omitted).
See BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 5–6 (“This flurry of [research] exhibited a broad sense that
as a public we have lost our capacity to agree on shared modes of validation as to what is going on
and what is just plain whacky.”); Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095 (discussing studies that show
people are “more likely to accept familiar information as true”).
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Individuals are often inclined to align their beliefs with those in their
communities, making echo chambers more powerful.111 According to a team
of law professors and social scientists examining fake news, “[r]esearch also
further demonstrates that people prefer information that confirms their
preexisting attitudes (selective exposure), view information consistent with
their preexisting beliefs as more persuasive than dissonant information
(confirmation bias), and are inclined to accept information that pleases them
(desirability bias).”112 Other scholars argue that retractions and refutations
are rarely effective, especially as time passes.113 People may be inclined to
accept false information over accurate facts, especially if disinformation is
repeated.114 Thus, social media users may not be able to distinguish true
from false information. More surprisingly, depending on their preferences,
they may not want to do so.
Third, the doctrine assumes that the speech environment will allow users
to distinguish between true and false information.115 This assumption is
especially troubling in the social media environment. False statements like
propaganda affect consumers’ ability to distinguish real from fake news
because false statements disguise the source. Propaganda operations may be
anonymous or may masquerade as legitimate news outlets.116 Adding to the
confusion over the veracity of information, legitimate and illegitimate news
outlets often exist in the same social media feeds.117 As Professor Lyrissa
Lidsky notes, the concept of a rational audience that can process the news
and assess the credibility and truth is a hallowed idea in First Amendment
theory but not an empirical reality.118
Given what we now know about human psychology, counterspeech may
not be sufficient to overcome false news. It might even be counterproductive
in some circumstances. Repeating false information, even in the context of
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095.
Id.
Paul & Matthews, supra note 22, at 9.
Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online Advertising, 91
S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1269 (2018).
Napoli, supra note 1, at 61.
Id. at 83.
Id.
See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 155 (2011)
(“First Amendment doctrines dealing with incendiary speech rest largely on the assumption that
audiences will behave rationally and not leap to violence when confronted with offensive or
inflammatory speech.”).
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counterspeech, may perversely increase the likelihood that people will believe
it. Empirical testing of claim repetition in fact-checking has been
inconclusive thus far.119
The fourth potentially flawed assumption of the Supreme Court’s
counterspeech doctrine is that there is no such thing as too much speech.
Neither Mill nor Brandeis could have foreseen the overwhelming amount of
speech freely available on the Internet and in today’s marketplace of ideas.120
Structural and economic changes in this era of news media and information
undermine the view that truth will prevail over falsity.121 The hypersensationalistic attributes, wide dissemination, and ease of production of fake
news could theoretically shrink the market for real journalism.122 The highvolume approach of Russian information warfare can drown out competing
messages. Justice Brandeis’s formulation of counterspeech assumes sufficient
time is available to separate truth from falsehood. In the face of
overwhelming amounts of both, separation may not be possible.
Fifth, the doctrine assumes that people exposed to false information are
more likely than not to be exposed to corresponding true information.123 The
doctrine did not foresee the social media bubbles that most users inhabit.
Counterspeech may never reach those most affected due to highly polarized
social media echo chambers.124 The flawed assumptions underlying the
doctrine of counterspeech sharply limit its effectiveness in the social media
environment.
Thus, past Supreme Court doctrine on the public square and
counterspeech may be incompatible with the context of the Internet and
social media. More research is required to discover the conditions under
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121
122
123

124

Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095.
See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L.
REV. 231, 250 (2017) (“[T]he entire analysis here takes place entirely within a set of search for
truth/marketplace of ideas justifications for freedom of speech, a set of justifications that has not
fared well when subject to close analytical and empirical scrutiny . . . .”). See generally Napoli, supra
note 1, at 61 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[G]iven the premises of democracy, there is no such thing as too much
speech.”).
Napoli, supra note 1, at 59.
Andorfer, supra note 106, at 1423–24.
See Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1343, 1357 (1997) (“[T]he efficacy of refutation still turns on whether the counter-message
comes to the attention of all persons who were swayed by the original idea.”).
Thai, supra note 68, at 310.
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which certain counterspeech methods might work. Counterspeech remains
the preferred remedy to false speech and disinformation under current First
Amendment doctrine. However, its effectiveness as a remedy in the social
media context is doubtful.
B. Political Speech and Protections for Falsehoods
Compounding the challenges of information warfare is that the First
Amendment protects “deliberate, nonlibelous falsehoods.”125 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has expanded and clarified these protections. In
the 2012 case of United States v. Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen
Valor Act, a federal statute that criminalized false claims that one had
received military medals.126 Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality, asserted
that First Amendment cases require the strictest scrutiny, regardless of
whether the content of speech is true or false. Few categories of speech, such
as obscenity, incitement to imminent lawless action, defamation, fighting
words, speech integral to criminal conduct, true threats, and child
pornography, are exempt from this ban on content-based regulation. Even
then, false speech may be constitutionally protected, as in defamation cases.
Under Alvarez, false statements can only be regulated if the speaker intended
to cause “legally cognizable harm” and a direct causal link exists between the
“restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”127 Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Kagan in concurrence, said that prohibitions of false speech
should receive only intermediate scrutiny. Despite the split holding, Alvarez
represents the Court’s most robust protections for false speech.
Following Alvarez, in 2016, the Sixth Circuit struck down a statute that
criminalized false statements made about political candidates as
unconstitutional suppression of speech and noted potential corresponding
chilling effects.128 Likewise, in 2010, the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he right
to speak and write whatever one chooses—including, to some degree,
worthless, offensive, and demonstrable untruths—without cowering in fear
of a powerful government is, in our view, an essential component of the
protection afforded by the First Amendment.”129 This line of precedent
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126
127
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Andorfer, supra note 106, at 1428 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012)).
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012).
Id. at 719, 725.
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
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would support the protection of fake news in the electoral context, especially
given potential chilling effects.
Supreme Court jurisprudence would not likely support legislation that
blocked false or misleading foreign speech merely on social value grounds.
For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court struck
down a state ban on the sale of violent video games to minors because speech,
regardless of cultural or intellectual worth, is protected by First Amendment
standards.130 And, in United States v. Stevens, the Court invalidated a federal
ban targeting fetishistic depictions of animal cruelty because “an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits” encouraging government
regulation infringes on First Amendment values.131
Stevens, in particular, suggests that the Court must conclude that the
government cannot regulate speech on the basis that it is distasteful or has
little social value. Instead, the speech must generate enough adverse effects
to justify a censoring of speech. If the government sought to bar speech
merely because it had less social value, it would limit the marketplace of
ideas. Even if speech has little social value, the First Amendment demands
that people can express and communicate their opinions to others, however
mistaken, disagreeable, or offensive others may find them. Given this
demand, it is unlikely that the government could block false or misleading
foreign speech merely on social value grounds.
Thus, under First Amendment jurisprudence, government restrictions on
foreign speech, even speech that promotes falsehoods, are likely
unconstitutional.132 A plurality of the Court has held that the First
Amendment protects fake news and that the government cannot restrict
speech of questionable social value. 133 Two other factors buttress this point.
First, because of the Internet’s globalizing function, domestic listeners now
have more access to foreign speech than ever.134 Second, First Amendment
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133
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564 U.S. 786, 786, 805 (2011).
559 U.S. 460, 461, 482 (2010).
See Thai, supra note 68, at 305 (noting that Supreme Court decisions “likely preclude the
government from barring the entry of political speech from abroad . . . or that the speech is valueless
or false . . . because the First Amendment demands an open marketplace of ideas for domestic
listeners.”).
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 710 (2012).
See Thai, supra note 68, at 274 (“[T]he digitization and globalization of speech on the internet has
made physical border restrictions largely irrelevant.”).

November 2019]

THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS?

109

doctrine emphasizes the listener’s robust right to receive speech.135 While
foreign speakers cannot claim First Amendment protection,136 prohibiting
U.S. persons from accessing foreign speech violates the right to receive
information and ideas.137 As long as listeners—even if they are unwilling
listeners—have the individual power to block the receipt of speech, the
government cannot bar speech distribution on a wholesale basis as a method
to protect listeners.138 A listener’s right to receive information does not
depend on the speaker’s nationality or from where the speech geographically
originated.139
C. The Incitement Standard is Limited in the Internet Context
Some Russian disinformation tactics resemble fact patterns in incitement
cases.140 For example, an IRA-created page for a fake organization, “Heart
of Texas,” promoted a public protest of the Islamic Da’wah Center in
Houston, specifically against the Center’s opening of a new library. One
comment urged, “Need to blow this place up. We don’t need this [expletive]
in Texas.” Another IRA-created page promoted a “Houston Counter
Against Hate.” The pages planned a protest and counter-protest for the
same day. The protesters on both sides fought verbally, but not physically.
However, First Amendment jurisprudence on incitement presents a high
bar to censoring or criminalizing such speech. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,141 the
seminal Supreme Court case on the topic, the Court defined criteria for
censoring speech. The Court held that a state may not prohibit any advocacy
of the use of force or the violation of a law unless it is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and [it] is likely to incite or produce such

135
136
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138
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Id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence).
Id. at 276 (“[T]he Court has neither held nor assumed that foreign speakers abroad enjoy any First
Amendment protection.”).
Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U.
L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2016) (noting that the marketplace of ideas theory “emphasizes the production
of information regardless of source”).
Thai, supra note 68, at 282.
Id.
Carolyn Y. Forrest, Russia’s Disinformation Campaign: The New Cold War, 33 COMMC’NS. LAW. 2,
Winter 2018, at 3 (discussing how the public was manipulated by Russian-linked content) (2018);
see also BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 263 (noting the disinformation campaign has orchestrated
real-world rallies).
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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action.”142 The Brandenburg standard is only satisfied if someone explicitly
urges serious, unlawful, and imminent conduct that is public and
ideological.143 Courts must consider the speech in context. The Court has
applied Brandenburg only twice since 1969 and has continued to uphold a
broad right to free speech.144
The imminence requirement of Brandenburg is difficult to apply to
incitement on the Internet for three reasons. First, as John Cronan notes,
words in the cyber-world are often “‘heard’ well after they are ‘spoken,’” and
are rarely heard by all readers simultaneously.”145 A provocative post would
survive the Brandenburg standard because a disqualifying delay would likely
occur between the time a reader or readers read the post and any unlawful
action. Second, the speaker-audience relationship on the Internet is different
than that imagined in Brandenburg. Internet posts are rarely designed for
specific individuals and can easily spread across large and undefined
audiences.146 Third, it can be difficult to assess the intent standard behind
an Internet post.147 Recently, in United States v. Carmichael, a federal district
court noted that, under Reno, “hostile speech disseminated to a broad
audience should be treated as less threatening than speech directed to a
specific person.”148 This suggests that incitement on the Internet may present
less concern than what is said in person. Thus, the Brandenburg standard likely
precludes the government from barring political speech from foreigners,
even if it advocates lawless action, because of the imminence standard.
Some scholars have proposed modifying the incitement standard to
encompass disinformation campaigns. John Cronan suggests a new
incitement standard for the Internet involving four primary factors: “(1)
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144
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Id. at 447.
Clarified in Hess v. Indiana, “imminent” means that the speech must direct the action to happen
right then. 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (reversing the conviction of an antiwar demonstrator on the
understanding that his statement did not advocate imminent or violent action). See also NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929 (1982) (holding that when appeals to a crowd are
protected speech when they do not incite lawless action).
Hess, 414 U.S. at 108; Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 927.
Cronan, supra note 95, at 428; see also Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63
UCLA L. REV. 1366, 1383 (2016) (discussing the Brandenburg opinion and its application to speech
protection).
Cronan, supra note 95, at 426.
Id. at 443.
Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The Continuing Importance of
Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 369 (2010).
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imminence from the perspective of the listener; (2) content of the message;
(3) likely audience; and (4) [the] nature of the issue involved.”149 However,
such a standard would likely raise First Amendment concerns. First, the
Brandenberg standard considers imminence based on the intent of the speaker
and the likelihood that the speech would cause imminent, unlawful action.
Prior caselaw suggests that the Supreme Court would be unlikely to drop the
requirement of the speaker’s intent. Second, due to the unforeseeable reach
of Internet postings, the audience that receives a post that imminently incites
unlawful action may be different than that which the speaker initially
intended.
Moreover, as Chen notes, modifying Brandenburg may be undesirable
because of the rapidly-changing contexts of the Internet and national
security.150 Courts often show more deference to the State, even in the
context of restrictions on civil liberties, during times of war or national
security crises.151 The current era of constant information warfare, plus the
proximity in time of Russia’s intervention in the 2016 elections, might lead
to restrictions on free speech that would be undesirable in the long term.
Thus, modification of the incitement standard in this manner is unlikely to
be a good option for combatting disinformation.
Some literature suggests modifying the imminence requirement by
attempting to show a “direct” link between online speech and the acts in
question as well as considering the target audience and instructions given.152
However, Michael Sherman argues that this is not an effective solution
because it “would likely be limited to a relatively small number of situations
in which a target could be pinpointed with some degree of specificity from
the speech in question.”153 Changing the Brandenburg standard would not
solve the jurisdictional and technological hurdles independent of First
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Cronan, supra note 95, at 455.
Chen, supra note 99, at 380 (suggesting that “it is premature to reconstruct the Brandenburg test to
address perceived changes in our global environment”).
Id. at 386.
See Lidsky, supra note 118, at 161–62 (“[A] satisfactory replacement for imminence in cyberincitement cases would focus on ensuring that the causal linkage between the speech and the harm
was a direct one . . . .”); see also Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in a Digital Era, 80
MISS. L. J. 1263, 1287 (2011) (noting that the Brandenburg approach was developed at a time before
the Internet).
Michael J. Sherman, Brandenburg v. Twitter, 28 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 127, 138–39
(2018).
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Amendment doctrinal concerns.154 When considering the slippery-slope
problem, changing this standard seems even more problematic. Moreover,
online platforms like Facebook receive criticism for applying their current
policies unfairly by favoring some groups over others.155 As Sherman
contends, while Facebook or Twitter “censorship” is vastly different from
government censorship, there is a societal cost to “barring people from
forums that are increasingly important to the exchange of ideas.”156
D. Surveillance, Privacy, and the Chilling Effect
Restrictions on U.S. Government surveillance of U.S. persons also place
the United States at an asymmetric disadvantage in fighting information
warfare. Should the United States seek to regulate social media to prevent
disinformation, it will need to surveil social media and other, similar
platforms to discover the disinformation.
However, government
observation, monitoring, or censorship of U.S. persons threatens freedom of
speech.157 Oversight may result in a chilling effect on social media posts,
which would raise fears of censorship in the new public square.158 Fear of
impingement on free speech, however, hampers the United States’ ability to
combat Russian influence campaigns.
1. 2018 Executive Order on Election Interference
In light of mounting evidence of Russian interference on the 2016
elections, President Trump issued an Executive Order on Election
Interference in 2018.159 However, this Order does not address the
patchwork of U.S. surveillance laws that have prevented the intelligence
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Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164; see also Mark MacCarthy & Washington Bytes, What Should Policymakers Do to Encourage
Better Platform Content Moderation?, FORBES (May 14, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/washingtonbytes/2019/05/14/what-should-policymakers-do-to-encourage-better-platformcontent-moderation/#14de817e1ee4 (“[D]eputizing platforms to remove legal material is a more
general rule of law problem . . . .”).
Howard, supra note 97, at 1367; see also BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 386 (noting that there
will likely be a substantial surveillance cost if there is “national security identification of foreign
propaganda campaigns”).
Howard, supra note 97, at 1368.
Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election, Exec.
Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg. 179 (Sept. 12, 2018).

November 2019]

THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS?

113

community from preventing threats to the electoral process. The Order
allows the intelligence community (“IC”) to respond after election
interference occurs, but not before. The Order provides that the Director of
National Intelligence (“DNI”) has forty-five days after the conclusion of a
federal election to determine whether a foreign government or agent has
“acted with the intent or purpose of interfering in that election.”160 The DNI
will assess the nature of the interference, the methods of interference, the
persons involved, and the foreign government(s) “that authorized, directed,
sponsored, or supported it.”161 After receiving DNI’s assessment, the
Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security will provide the
President and Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury with a report
evaluating the extent to which the interference affected the security and
integrity of the (1) election infrastructure162 and results and (2) political
organizations, campaigns, or candidates, if they were targeted.163
While the Order mentions that any actions by the intelligence
community must respect First Amendment principles, it provides little
guidance as to how the intelligence community can simultaneously collect
intelligence relating to foreign interference in U.S. elections. Without
addressing laws that restrict national security actors from conducting
necessary surveillance to protect First Amendment freedoms, this executive
order will do little to keep Russia and other foreign actors from influencing
U.S. elections.
2. The Privacy Act
The Privacy Act of 1974 presents a formidable hurdle to combatting
information warfare. The Act was passed following Watergate, at the height
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Id. § 1(a). The DNI will make this determination in consultation with appropriate agencies.
Id.
The Order defines “election infrastructure” as “information and communications technology and
systems used by or on behalf of the Federal Government or a State or local government in managing
the election process, including voter registration databases, voting machines, voting tabulation
equipment, and equipment for the secure transmission of election results.” Id. § 8(d). For discussion
on how states and the Federal Government can improve the integrity of their election
infrastructure, see the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Russian Active Measures
Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, S. REP. NO. 116-XX, at 54–61 (2019)
(providing seven recommendations for improving cybersecurity in election infrastructure).
Exec. Order No. 13,848, supra note 159, § 1(b)(ii). The report will be generated in consultation with
appropriate agencies and state and local officials. Id. § 1(b).
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of public concern over abuse of government surveillance.164 It regulates the
government’s collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally
identifiable information about individuals contained in federal agency record
systems.165 The Act seeks to protect individual privacy by preventing the
unnecessary release or exposure of individual data.
The Privacy Act requires that the public can identify general national
databases or “systems of records,” which contain individually identifying
information.166 Individuals whose data is stored in these databases have the
right to access, correct, or amend the information within it. The rules and
regulations within the Privacy Act change depending on what type of agency
is involved, the content of data, and how the data would be used.167 The Act
covers only databases from which an individual’s data is retrievable using a
personal identifier, such as a name or Social Security number.168 Any
information collected must be “relevant and necessary to accomplish a
[required] purpose of the agency.”169 Furthermore, when an agency
establishes or revises the “existence or character” of a database, it must
publish a notice in the Federal Register describing the records and how the
government may use them.170
164
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168
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170

William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism: The Intelligence/Law Enforcement Dilemma—A History,
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1099, 1110 (2007) (recounting the “various abuses by intelligence
agencies, including NSA surveillance of Americans and drug traffickers, U.S. Army military
intelligence surveillance of domestic groups, FBI covert operations against alleged subversive
groups, CIA opening of domestic mail sent to or received from abroad, and electronic surveillance
of political ‘enemies’”).
See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (stating its purpose is “to
amend title 5, United States Code, by adding a section 552a to safeguard individual privacy from
the misuse of federal records, to provide that individuals be granted access to records concerning
them which are maintained by federal agencies . . . .”).
Statutory confidentiality guarantees prevent law enforcement agencies from accessing some
databases, like Census Bureau databases. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2017); U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, The “72-Year Rule,” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last visited Oct. 20,
2019), https://www.census.gov/history/www/genealogy/decennial_census_records/the_72_yea
r_rule_1.html (“The U.S. government will not release personally identifiable information about an
individual to any other individual or agency until 72 years after it was collected for the decennial
census.”). The Privacy Act does not apply to this and other databases covered by specific
confidentiality laws.
For instance, the Census Bureau is allowed to use personal records for statistical purposes. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(k)(4) (2017).
Id. § 552a(a)(5) (defining a “system of records” as a “group of any records under the control of any
agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual”).
Id. § 552a(e)(1).
Records, according to the Privacy Act, are:
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When requesting data, federal agencies must clarify the authority under
which the agency can solicit the information, and whether disclosing that
information to the requesting agency is mandatory or voluntary.171 This
requirement serves as an additional check to ensure that information in the
database is not freely accessed or accessed without cause by agencies.
Agencies can access or acquire the information gathered and “donated” to
the database only on a need-to-know basis.
The only category of sensitive data identified by the Privacy Act is
personal data related to the exercise of First Amendment rights. Under
section 552a(e)(7) of the Privacy Act, the government cannot maintain
records of a U.S. person’s First Amendment activities. In other words, the
Privacy Act prevents a government agency from keeping a file about how
someone exercises their right to free speech. The Act generally prohibits
disclosure of any stored information—not just First Amendment
information—without the written consent of the subject individual.
However, protection for the data related to First Amendment activities
does not apply to “authorized law enforcement activit[ies]” and some CIA
activities.172 Law enforcement agencies like the FBI do not have a duty to
disclose such collections. An agency may not have to obtain written
permission if the disclosure is subject to one of twelve statutory exceptions.
Notably, law enforcement agencies, or components thereof, that primarily
perform criminal law enforcement duties need not make disclosures. The
CIA may also exempt by rule any system of records it maintains, as explicitly
provided for in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1).173

171
172
173

[A]ny item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained
by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical
history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger
or voice print or a photograph.
Id. § 552a(a)(4).
Id. § 552a(e)(3)(A).
Id. § 552a(e)(7); see also LEVINSON-WALDMAN, infra note 176, at 12 (discussing the misuses of the
NSA’s broad surveillance authority).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) (2017) (authorizing the CIA Director to promulgate rules exempting
documents from the access provisions of the Act); see, e.g., Mobley v. CIA, 924 F. Supp. 2d 24, 55–
56 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding records necessarily exempt from the disclosure provisions of the Privacy
Act because they concern intelligence methods); see also 32 C.F.R. § 1901.62(d) (2019) (providing
that individuals cannot access portions of the systems of records the CIA maintains that consist of
or would reveal “intelligence sources or methods” and “documents or information provided by
foreign, federal, state, or other public agencies”).
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The Act’s purpose is to guarantee better protection of U.S. persons’
privacy by limiting the circumstances in which their information is retained
and shared.174 Private litigation is the primary mechanism for legal oversight
under the Privacy Act,175 and government officials may be subject to criminal
prosecution for certain violations of it.176 However, the Act does not apply
to data collected about persons outside the United States, nor does it protect
the privacy of records that are maintained by the private sector or local or
state governments.
The Privacy Act has been attacked from all sides. The DOJ has criticized
the Act’s imprecise language, limited legislative history, and outdated
guidelines.177 Some scholars and research organizations, like the Brennan
Center for Justice, argue that the Act’s exceptions for national security and
law enforcement undermine its goals of protecting privacy. Rather than
serving as a substantial check on government power to collect records, the
Act functions as a “box-checking exercise.”178 Beyond the exceptions, gaps
in the Privacy Act itself do not account for contingencies and potential threats
to privacy. For example, the Act has no third-party privacy exemption to
prevent the disclosure of information about the third party in another’s file.179
If Person A agreed to disclose information, the requesting agency could still
use the data of Person B that exists in Person A’s file.
Most importantly for this Article’s broader considerations, the law
enforcement and nationality exemptions allow agencies to exempt

174
175
176

177
178

179

See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, infra note 176, at 49 n.413 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-1183, at 6916–18,
6920 (1974)).
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2017).
Id. § 552a(i); see also RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE
GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 12 (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/Data%20Retention%20-%20FINAL.pdf (noting the misuses of
the NSA’s surveillance authority).
Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/
introduction (last updated July 27, 2015).
LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 49; see also Julia Angwin, U.S. Terrorism Agency to Tap a Vast
Database of Citizens, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324478304578171623040640006 (quoting an observation by a Privacy Act
consultant to government agencies: “All you have to do is publish a notice in the Federal Register
and you can do whatever you want.”).
Evan M. Stone, The Invasion of Privacy Act: The Disclosure of My Information in Your Government File, 19
WIDENER L. REV. 345, 348 (2013) (discussing the dilemma that is faced when a person requests
access to something under the Privacy Act, but the file also contains information about another
person).
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“databases from the provisions requiring transparency and an opportunity
to challenge the accuracy of personal information,”180 without detailed
justification. The meaning of this provision is not entirely clear, but it seems
to create a loophole for agencies that act in national security or law
enforcement capacities to subvert the Act’s protections on personal privacy
and liberty, opening the door to a chilling effect on speech.
The knowledge that the government might be collecting one’s Facebook
posts could deter such posts being shared, thereby chilling free speech. The
concern is not baseless. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
recently published notice of an update to its current system of record, which
is regulated by the Privacy Act. This update, closed for comment on October
18, 2017, allows DHS to consider whether the social media presence of
persons seeking to gain entry to the United States justifies refusal of a visa.
The update also involves DHS storing social media data of immigrants with
green cards, naturalized citizens, and permanent residents.181 Another
update allows DHS to source any information that is publicly available on
the Internet on the record.182 Under this update, DHS considers social
media handles, aliases, search results, and associated information.
Immigrants are not U.S. persons until they obtain green cards or citizenship,
so DHS may legally collect data related to their First Amendment activity.
However, these updates affect U.S. citizens who communicate with
immigrants, who may self-censor out of fear that the government could use
the information they convey with those overseas against them. Although the
Privacy Act explicitly protects citizens and permanent residents, immigrants’
social media data may include information about protected persons. In other
words, U.S. citizens who interact with foreign visa applicants will have their
data collected as third parties.

180
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5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (2017); LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 51.
It is unclear whether social media information collected during one’s immigration process can
be used or shared after one is naturalized. See Aleksander “Sasha” Danielyan, EFF Urges DHS to
Abandon Social Media Surveillance and Automated “Extreme Vetting” of Immigrants, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/11/eff-urges-dhs-abandon-socialmedia-surveillance-and-automated-extreme-vetting (explaining that information publicly available
on the internet can be used by DHS for immigration enforcement purposes).
Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS-2017-0038-0001 (providing notice that DHS is
updating their Privacy Act System of Records).
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Further, the Privacy Act does not regulate actions committed in the
course of an FBI investigation, nor how data is documented in the
investigation if the data is pertinent to authorized law enforcement activity.
Requiring a blanket prohibition on surveillance and recording until “the
agency was investigating a specific offense or a specific person”183 would
severely undermine agency activities. Therefore, as long as the law
enforcement agency prepares documents for a law enforcement purpose, it
will not violate the Privacy Act even if the agency references First
Amendment activity.
Courts in Privacy Act cases have found that national security concerns
generally prevail over concerns about the potential of the government’s
actions to chill speech—advertently or inadvertently—where collecting the
information is “pertinent to and within the scope of a currently ongoing
authorized law enforcement activity.”184 However, courts have upheld
claims regarding the expungement of records that do not meet this standard.
The Ninth Circuit case of Garris v. Federal Bureau of Investigation clarifies
this standard.185
In Garris, the FBI had collected records and created memoranda
regarding the plaintiff’s Internet and social media activities.186 The plaintiff
argued that, under the Privacy Act, the FBI’s collection of his First
Amendment data was illegal, and that the Bureau’s maintenance of these
records in perpetuity was illegal because the records were not relevant to an
active investigation.187 The district court previously granted summary
judgment for the FBI.188
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between the
maintenance of First Amendment data and the “incidental” collection of
183
184

185
186
187
188

MacPherson v. IRS, 803 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1986).
Garris v. FBI, 937 F.3d 1284, 1294 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added); see, e.g., MacPherson, 803 F.2d
at 484–85 (considering “the factors for and against the maintenance of such records of First
Amendment activities on an individual, case-by-case basis” and holding the IRS and DOJ’s
maintenance of the appellant’s protest speeches fell under the law enforcement exception because
of their public nature); see also Bassiouni v. FBI, 436 F.3d 712, 718–19, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding
that the FBI did not violate the Privacy Act); Afifi v. Lynch, 101 F. Supp. 3d 90, 107 (D.D.C. 2015)
(granting summary judgment because the records at issue complied with the Privacy Act).
Garris, 937 F.3d at 1300; Raimondo v. FBI, No. 13-cv-02295-JSC, 2016 WL 2642038, at *1–3
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Garris v. FBI, 937 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2019).
Garris, 937 F.3d at 1299; Raimondo, 2016 WL 2642038 at *11–16.
Garris, 937 F.3d at 1288.
Id.; Raimondo, 2016 WL 2642038 at *16.
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First Amendment data pursuant to an authorized law enforcement
activity.189 Regarding the maintenance of data, the court held that “because
the investigations underlying the Memos have concluded, the FBI’s
maintenance of the Memos is not pertinent to an authorized ongoing law
enforcement activity and therefore violates the [Privacy] Act.”190 To meet
its burden to show that records are pertinent to an authorized ongoing or
future law enforcement activity, an agency must “articulate a sufficient law
enforcement activity to which the maintenance of the record is pertinent,”191
that is, presents a basis as to why the agency needs to continue to maintain it
that is more than “speculative relevance.”192 Therefore, even where the
original investigation leading to the collection of the records ends, an agency
can still retain the record if it is “pertinent to an authorized law enforcement
activity.”193 Since the record in question was not relevant to an ongoing law
enforcement activity, the court held that the FBI must expunge the record,
contrary to the lower court’s determination.194
Although the Ninth Circuit required expungement of one of the
memoranda related to the plaintiff’s specific case, the Ninth Circuit left
undisturbed the lower court’s decision that an agency can retain records
containing “incidental” collection of First Amendment information as long
as the surveillance itself is relevant to an ongoing law enforcement activity.195
The district court had recognized that the FBI’s activities could potentially
chill speech. However, it asserted that “[t]o forbid ‘incidental’ surveillance
of innocent people or to require excision of references to such people in
surveillance records would be administratively cumbersome and damaging
189

190
191
192
193
194
195

By “incidental” collection of data, the court refers to data collected during the FBI’s observation
and surveillance of plaintiff’s website postings and other First Amendment activities. Garris, 937
F.3d at 1300. The term “incidental” is used in other cases, and colloquially, to refer to data about
third parties collected as a result of law enforcement activity regarding other individuals. See, e.g.,
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
6 (2014) (describing that section 702 surveillance can result in the “incidental” collection of U.S.
person communication where she communicates with a non-U.S. person who has been targeted).
It is unclear whether the court accepts this broader usage.
Garris, 937 F.3d at 1294.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1300.
Id.; see Raimondo v. FBI, No. 13-CV-02295-JSC, 2018 WL 398236, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018),
aff'd sub nom. Garris v. FBI, 937 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2019).
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to the completeness and accuracy of the agency records.”196 Thus, the court
interpreted the Privacy Act to allow “incidental” observation and collection
of First Amendment data for valid law enforcement or national security
reasons.197
III. REMEDIES
Free political speech is a cherished American freedom. Yet, prioritizing
it has paradoxically led to an assault on U.S. values. As discussed above,
U.S. law and Supreme Court doctrine constrain the United States’ ability to
fight disinformation campaigns. By upholding broad protections for both
political speech and false speech, the Supreme Court created an environment
in which Russian information warfare can flourish. Other laws meant to
protect American freedoms, like the Privacy Act, paradoxically limit the
United States’ ability to protect the democracy that preserves those liberties.
Scholars have proposed some solutions to these problems, such as
modification of the incitement standard, use of counterspeech, and revision
of current laws. However, these fixes are insufficient to solve the problem of
disinformation campaigns.
The United States must fight information warfare on all fronts. Reforms
to doctrine, laws, and policies are needed to protect national security.
Congress and courts must be careful to balance civil liberties with the need
to protect national security in the Internet age. Fortunately, many remedies
for this First Amendment problem exist within current First Amendment
doctrine. Others are discoverable through creative policies that comport
with existing First Amendment principles, including legislation, regulation of
online platforms, and voluntary actions by online platforms.
A. Doctrinal Remedies
1. Distinguish the Internet and Social Media Contexts
First Amendment jurisprudence must be reformed to account for the
realities of the Internet and social media. This distinction is a prerequisite
for modifying current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Internet as the
public square. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has tried to place the
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Raimondo, 2018 WL 398236 at *16 (quoting MacPherson v. IRS, 803 F.2d 479, 484) (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at *11–16.
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Internet, broadly speaking, into the framework of the “new public square.”
This has led to a doctrine based on flawed intellectual assumptions. Courts
should instead recognize the Internet and social media for the distinct legal
animals that they are. A platypus should not be likened to other mammals
while it is laying eggs. Similarly, the Internet and social media may be
regulated when they behave in a manner distinct from traditional media and
the public square, and the legal frameworks and doctrine that apply to them
must be modified accordingly. This is especially critical when national
security is at stake.
2. Distinguish the Electoral Context
Under current law, the U.S. Government might not have the legal
authority to shut down, block, or mask First Amendment-protected speech
by a U.S. person absent a clear showing that the U.S. person is operating as
an unregistered agent of a foreign power. As detailed above, limitations on
freedom of expression in the United States, such as libel and obscenity, are
narrow and tightly controlled. Lies can be protected speech, especially when
they relate to politics. Courts have ruled that the First Amendment protects
statements about political candidates that are arguably false but nondefamatory, even if they seek to promote electoral interference.198 Few
circumstances exist in which the government is permitted to determine
whether or not speech is truthful. As government activities increase in the
domain of social media, it becomes more likely that the government will chill
protected political speech, including political speech that is anti-government.
However, the electoral context may merit special constitutional
protections. The First Amendment recognizes the primacy of political
speech because of the importance of robust and free public discourse to a
democracy. Six of our twenty-seven constitutional amendments focus on the
expansion of the right to vote and clarification that the vote should not be
suppressed on discriminatory grounds, reflecting that free and fair elections
are fundamental to American democracy.199
198

199

See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that political
false-statement laws were unconstitutional); Rickert v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 831
(Wash. 2007) (holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibits a person from sponsoring a political
advertisement containing a false statement); State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No!
Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 699 (Wash. 1998) (holding a statute that prohibits sponsoring an
advertisement with a false statement unconstitutional).
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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When the right to free speech clashes with the freeness and fairness of the
electoral process, it follows that speech freedoms that may not be abridged
in other areas may be balanced against a societal interest in the integrity of
the electoral process. Such restrictions might apply only to speech designed
to threaten the integrity of the electoral process or to infringe upon the right
to vote by suppressing turnout of certain groups. Laws need not restrict
political speech in debates or other contexts previously considered in First
Amendment cases.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the First Amendment supports such a
balancing test. Packingham left room for the government to regulate the
Internet and social media if such regulation passes strict scrutiny.200
Elsewhere, in Brown v. Hartlage, the Court recognized the state’s “legitimate
interest” in preserving the integrity of the electoral process.201 The Court
noted that this might be enough to justify some limitations on speech, so long
as “the restriction operate[s] without unnecessarily circumscribing protected
expression.”202 The government has a clear and compelling interest in
protecting the constitutionally protected right to vote, necessary to satisfy the
strict scrutiny standard. Thus, narrowly tailored legislation that limits some
speech to protect the freeness and fairness of the electoral process or the right
to vote might be constitutional. Such limitations on foreign individuals’
speech are even more likely to survive strict scrutiny.203 Constitutional
protections are weaker for foreign individuals than they are for U.S. persons,
especially as related to the electoral process, as will be discussed below.
The Court, moreover, has recognized that the government may
permissibly limit defamatory, deliberate falsehoods, or speech made with
reckless disregard for its truthfulness, because these types of speech may
subvert the purposes of democratic government. In Garrison v. Louisiana, the
Court held that the First Amendment restricts a state’s power to impose
criminal sanctions for criticism of official conduct of public officials, but left

200
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Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982).
Id. at 53–54.
This Article follows Supreme Court practice and uses the terms “foreign citizen” and “alien”
interchangeably to refer to individuals who are not citizens of the United States. These terms do
not include individuals who are dual citizens of a foreign country and the United States. The term
“foreign national” covers foreign citizens except for lawful permanent residents (LPRs, commonly
known as “green card holders.” See 2 U.S.C. § 441e(b) (2002).
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room for other regulation of falsehoods in the electoral context.204 Garrison
extended the New York Times v. Sullivan (“Sullivan”) “actual malice” standard
for defamation to the criminal context. In Garrison, a district attorney was
convicted of criminal defamation for disparaging judges of the criminal
district court during a press conference, with respect to a backlog of pending
criminal cases.205 The district attorney asserted that the backlog of cases was
due to the “inefficiency, laziness and excessive vacations of the judges,”
which hindered his efforts to enforce vice laws, and said that the judges have
“made it eloquently clear where their sympathies lie” regarding certain vice
investigations.206 The attorney was convicted under the Louisiana Criminal
Defamation Statute, which permitted “a finding of malice based on an intent
merely to inflict harm, rather than an intent to inflict harm through
falsehood.”207 The Louisana Supreme Court found that the district
attorney’s statements impermissibly constituted an attack on the judge’s
character, rather than official conduct.208 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Court noted that falsehoods are
constitutionally protected to ensure that freedom of speech is not chilled.
The Court further held that the criticism was of official conduct as well as
personal character, noting that “anything which might touch on an official’s
fitness for office is relevant.”209
However, the Court noted that the Sullivan rule does not protect all
political speech, nor all falsehoods. In the context of defamation, knowing
and reckless falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment.210 A
statute that criminalized an intent to inflict harm through falsehood—not
just an intent to inflict harm—might be constitutional.211 For a speaker to
face civil or criminal liability under such a statute, the public official must
“establish[ ] that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge
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Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 76; see also Volokh, supra note 145, at 1391 (“Garrison came eight months after New York Times
v. Sullivan, which famously required a mens rea as to falsehood: A defendant could only be held
liable if the defendant knew or was reckless about the falsity of the accusation.”).
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
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of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.”212 The
Court explained that:
Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful
exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly
and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like
immunity . . . . That speech is used as a tool for political ends does not
automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution. For
the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of
democratic government . . . . Calculated falsehood falls into that class of
utterances which “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”213

Garrison arguably allows speakers to be held liable in the defamation context
for falsehoods that meet a high standard of intent. Garrison noted that a
statute proscribing a private citizen’s “intent to inflict harm through
falsehood” in the electoral context might survive strict scrutiny.214 This
might apply to U.S. persons as well as foreigners. Thus, Garrison’s holding
may extend to proscribe defamatory fake news or false speech designed to
inflict harm through falsehood, or a coordinated campaign of falsehoods,
when actual malice is present.
3. Restrict False Speech Designed to Skew Elections
Congress might also pass a narrowly tailored law that would prohibit false
speech that is designed to attack the integrity of the electoral process. As
mentioned above, the First Amendment protects false speech. Alvarez
represents the U.S. Supreme Court’s strongest statement of the importance
of protecting falsehoods. However, Alvarez allows for a statute prohibiting
knowing or reckless false speech intended to disrupt the integrity of a
government process.215
Alvarez leaves room for placing knowing or reckless falsehoods outside of
First Amendment protection. In overruling the Stolen Valor Act, the Court
noted that the Stolen Valor Act targets falsity but nothing else.216 Other
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Id. at 74.
Id. at 75 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Id. at 73.
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 710 (2012).
Id. at 718.
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cases in which the Court has noted that false speech has no constitutional
value, or less constitutional value than truthful speech, involved another type
of legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement. For example,
the Court has upheld statutes prohibiting false speech made in the context of
fraud, or invasion of privacy.217 The Court noted that in those cases, “the
falsity of the speech at issue was not irrelevant to our analysis, but neither
was it determinative.”218 The Court discussed instances in which restrictions
on false speech are permissible, such as perjury statutes, which are
unquestionably constitutional because perjured testimony obstructs justice
because it can cause a court to make a judgment premised on falsehoods.219
Moreover, statutes that prohibit falsely representing that one is speaking on
behalf of the government, or that prohibit impersonating a government
official, do not simply restrict false speech but protect the integrity of a
government process.220
Thus, a narrowly tailored statute restricting speech intended to attack the
integrity of the electoral process might pass strict scrutiny. Here, the false
speech itself would not be constitutionally protected only where such speech
is designed to ensure that elections are not free and fair. Under the test
advanced in Alvarez, the government would have to be able to provide
evidence that shows that the public’s general perception of the integrity of
the electoral process “is diluted by false claims” such as those at issue,221 that
counterspeech would be unable to “overcome the lie,”222 and that less
restrictive measures were unhelpful.223 The Supreme Court would be more
likely to uphold a statute restricting such speech by non-U.S. persons since
constitutional protections are weaker when applied to foreigners. However,
Alvarez’s rationale suggests that such speech by U.S. persons could be
restricted as well.
Currently, the Supreme Court applies strict or exacting scrutiny to any
legislation placing content-based restrictions on First Amendment freedoms.
However, the Court must balance two competing First Amendment
freedoms in its jurisprudence. An individual’s First Amendment right to
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Id.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 720–21.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 729.
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political speech must be balanced against U.S. persons’ First Amendment
right to political expression through free and fair elections. Therefore, the
Court should consider potential harm to American civil liberties from
legislative restriction on an individual’s right to disinformation versus
potential harm to society from interference with the ultimate expression of
U.S. persons’ political speech via a free and fair electoral process. As noted
above, in Chaplinsky, the Court justified restrictions on incitement because
“such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”224 Following this standard, the Court might balance the social
value of any disinformation “as a step to truth” against the social interest in
free and fair elections.225 Such a balancing test would be consistent with the
Court’s prior jurisprudence on free speech. The Court has held the right to
political speech to be paramount precisely because of the importance of free
and robust political discourse to self-government. It follows that protecting
free and fair self-government would be a legitimate reason for restricting
some speech. The Court has also excluded from First Amendment
protection some types of speech that are likely to lead to tangible harm to
individuals or society, like incitement to imminent lawless action or fighting
words. Speech that is designed to undermine the integrity of U.S. elections
is harmful not only to the right to self-government but also to national
security. The Supreme Court should not always prioritize national security
over civil liberties. However, the Court should not ignore national security
concerns either, especially those that implicate constitutional concerns like
free and fair elections. In considering legislation and efforts responding to
disinformation campaigns, the Court must consider the overall context and
intent of the campaign and response, rather than merely an individual’s
isolated act of speech.
The Supreme Court may also adopt a new standard for evaluating
harmful, blatantly false speech. In his concurring opinion in Alvarez, Justice
Breyer proposed an intermediate scrutiny approach in evaluating blatantly
false speech that would replace the exacting scrutiny or strict scrutiny
standards used in most free speech cases.226 As described by scholar Jeffrey
224
225
226

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Id.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 732 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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C. Barnum,227 Breyer’s test considers the harmfulness of targeted speech228
and the potential constitutional harm in the regulation of the targeted
speech.229 The test also considers whether the government could have
achieved its objective by less restrictive means.230 Building on Breyer’s
approach, the Court could balance these factors to ensure that any statute
regulating fake news and misinformation that is designed to skew elections
does not create “disproportionate constitutional harm.”231 It could require
the government to show that less restrictive means, such as counterspeech,
would be insufficient to achieve the governmental interest.232 In the online
context, the government might have to show that online platforms are not
taking sufficient steps to eradicate fake news or disinformation. Breyer’s
pragmatic approach is limited by the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness
of counterspeech as a remedy for fake news or disinformation designed to
skew the electoral process. However, Breyer’s approach presents a useful
starting point from which to develop constitutionally permissible regulation
of false speech.
4. Restrict Speech by Foreign Individuals in the Electoral Context
Restrictions narrowly tailored to prohibit threats to the electoral process
by foreign individuals are especially likely to pass constitutional muster. First
Amendment protections are most robust where U.S. persons engage in noncommercial speech, weaker when applied to foreign individuals inside the
United States, and weakest when applied to foreign persons outside of the
United States.233 Foreign individuals within the United States can generally
enjoy First Amendment freedoms of speech.
However, the U.S.
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Jeffrey C. Barnum, Encouraging Congress to Encourage Speech: Reflections on United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB.
L. REV. 527, 535–36 (2013) (deriving three major aspects of Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny test).
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 734–37.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 739.
Id.
See, e.g., Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S.
1104 (2012) (explaining limits of constitutional protections for foreigner individuals); Daniel Fried
& Alina Polyakova, Democratic Defense Against Disinformation, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 4 (Feb. 2018),
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Democratic_Defense_Against_
Disinformation_FINAL.pdf (“First Amendment protections . . . seem weaker when applied to
foreign persons, especially those outside the United States.”).
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Government may limit the rights of foreign individuals when it comes to
distributing propaganda and participating in the electoral process.
The Supreme Court has permitted restrictions on speech that qualifies as
foreign propaganda. In Meese v. Keene, the Supreme Court upheld a provision
of the Foreign Agent Registration Act (“FARA”) that required foreign agents
seeking to distribute “political propaganda” within the United States to file
with the Attorney General, report on the extent of dissemination, and label
the material with the identity of the foreign agent and its registry with
DOJ.234 Foreign propaganda is defined as any communication from a
foreign source intended to influence U.S. foreign policy. Because the Act
only requires foreign agents to make disclosures that would allow the public
to evaluate the propaganda better, the Court found that FARA’s provision
“place[d] no burden on protected expression.”235 Although FARA may not
burden the content of the expression, it does place an additional restriction
on the ability of foreign agents to make certain types of speech. Thus, Meese
may leave an opening for additional regulation of speech by foreign agents,
so long as it does not “burden protected expression.” Under Meese, a
requirement for registration of foreign agent-sponsored political
advertisements or labeling of posts by foreign agents on social media
platforms might be permissible.
A recent campaign finance case guides how foreign speech in the
electoral context might be constitutionally regulated. In Bluman v. Federal
Election Commission, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
upheld a federal statute barring foreign nationals staying temporarily in the
United States from contributing to state and federal electoral candidates,
contributing to national political parties and outside political groups, and
making expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a political
candidate.236 Per the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the case was heard
by a three-judge panel, then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which
summarily affirmed.237
Then-D.C. Circuit Court Judge Kavanaugh, writing for the three-judge
panel, asserted that the government might bar foreign citizens, such as those
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481 U.S. 465, 470–71, 485 (1987).
Id. at 480.
800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011).
Id. at 282.
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who are not lawful permanent residents of the United States,238 from
participating in express advocacy in political campaigns or its functional
equivalent if the foreign citizen’s goal is to influence how voters cast their
ballots.239 In the campaign finance context, an express advocacy expenditure
is one that funds “express campaign speech” or its “functional equivalent.”240
An advertisement is the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy if it “is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate.”241 Kavanaugh highlights that express
advocacy expenditures “finance advertisements, get-out-the-vote drives,
rallies, candidate speeches, and the myriad other activities by which
candidates appeal to potential voters.”242 Express advocacy is distinct from
issue advocacy, or advocating for a particular political position or issue.
The court noted the thorny nature of the legal question at issue, which
implicated both First Amendment rights and the strict scrutiny they
ordinarily receive, and a matter of foreign affairs and national security that
would ordinarily be subject to deferential rational basis review.243 However,
the court concluded that the statute would survive strict scrutiny, which
meant that the court did not need to decide the appropriate standard of
review.244 After reviewing caselaw on the rights of foreign citizens in the
United States, the court concluded that the caselaw reveals a
“straightforward principle: It is fundamental to the definition of our national
political community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to
participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities of democratic selfgovernment.”245
Since political contributions and express-advocacy
expenditures are an integral part of the U.S. electoral process, these
campaign activities are part of the process of democratic self-government.
Limiting foreign participation in the electoral process is “part of the
sovereign’s obligation to preserve the basic conception of a political
community,” of which foreigners are, by definition, not a part.246
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See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (2017) (defining foreign national for election contribution regulations).
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 456 (2007).
Id. at 469–70.
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 285–86.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 287.
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The court in Bluman specifically did not decide whether Congress could
constitutionally extend the statutory ban on express advocacy by foreigners
to lawful permanent residents. Nor did the court decide whether Congress
could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in issue advocacy and other
speech outside contributions to candidates and parties, express-advocacy
expenditures, and donations247 to outside groups to be used for contributions
to candidates and parties and express-advocacy expenditures. The court
further cautioned the government that seeking criminal penalties for the
statute would require proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the law.248
Following Bluman, Congress could plausibly create legislation to ban
foreigners from engaging in express advocacy in political campaigns. Bluman
suggests that a ban on electoral participation by foreigners is permissible if its
scope is limited to regulation of express advocacy or its functional equivalent.
Under Bluman, it seems that the United States has a compelling interest in
limiting the actions of foreign citizens in American self-government,
including preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.
However, no court has defined what it means for an operation to be
“designed to influence our electoral process.” In the campaign finance
context, spending money on political advertisements is designed to influence
the election. The same cannot be said as easily for social media posts and
tweets.
Still, legislation prohibiting express advocacy by foreigners would not
have prohibited all of the Russian disinformation campaigns. Bluman
construed the foreign spending ban as express advocacy, but not issue
advocacy. Issue advocacy is speech that does not expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a specific candidate. Much of the Russian
disinformation campaign involved disseminating false news about Hillary
Clinton or magnifying societal divides about issues like police violence, which
does not amount to express advocacy for the election or defeat of a particular
candidate. Moreover, even a Russian-sponsored advertisement promising to
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Foreign nationals cannot contribute to, or make expenditures in connection with, a U.S. election
of any level. 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012); see also 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i) (2019) (expanding regulation
of the political expenditures of foreign nationals); Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Opinion 200017 (July 28, 2000), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2000-17.pdf (barring domestic subsidiaries of
foreign corporations from establishing political action committees if financed by a foreign parent
company or if individual foreign nationals participate in its operations).
Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292.

November 2019]

THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS?

131

“Make America Great Again” might be considered issue advocacy
depending on the context. Notably, the court in Bluman did “not decide
whether Congress could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in speech
other than contributions.”249 Bluman thus cannot be read to support bans on
lobbying or issue advocacy by foreigners.250 However, Bluman’s reasoning
that foreign citizens can be excluded from the activities of self-government to
preserve a national political community suggests that additional restrictions
on foreign nationals’ participation in the electoral process may be
appropriate.
To restrict these forms of political expression, Congress would have to
show that the restriction furthers the compelling interest in preventing
foreign influence over the U.S. political process and could achieve this goal
at a cost that imposed a tolerable level of collateral damage to civil liberties.
The legislation must be narrowly tailored so as not to include protected forms
of speech. A balancing test to evaluate such legislation should consider the
identity of the speaker, the intent of the speaker, the nature and extent of the
restriction on speech, the type and potential gravity of harm to the electoral
process, and the type and gravity of potential harm to the speaker if the
speech were restricted.
As mentioned above, Garrison might permit the government to proscribe
a private citizen’s speech made with an “intent to inflict harm through
falsehood” in the electoral context, regardless of whether the speaker is a U.S.
person or a foreigner.251 The unique characteristics of social media suggest
that greater regulation of speech in the electoral context might be allowed
irrespective of the speaker’s identity. The Court must reconsider the balance
of considerations that have produced its First Amendment jurisprudence. If
the target of the legislation is a U.S. person, a different calculus applies
because of potential restrictions on U.S. persons’ civil liberties. If the target
is a non-U.S. person, the balance of considerations would be different
because constitutional protections are weaker for non-U.S. persons,
especially if they are outside the United States.
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Id.
Id.
See discussion infra p. 139.
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5. A Note on Principal, Agent, and Attribution Problems
Although regulation of speech by foreigners in the electoral context may
be constitutionally permissible, a question remains as to what counts as
speech by foreigners. When a state does not overtly sponsor media outlets
or actors, these entities fall into a legal gray zone. Online trolls, for example,
fall into a gray area between individuals expressing their opinions and semiorganized non-state actors following a particular foreign state’s political
agenda.252 The line between online activists’ free speech and a foreign state’s
interference in elections, therefore, may be thin.253 Attribution of an
individual’s conduct to a non-state actor can pose even more legal obstacles.
Further complications exist when information warfare is conducted by a
foreign state using U.S. servers. For example, Russian actors conducted
information warfare campaigns using U.S.-based servers. Intelligence
collection in such a scenario would involve investigation of U.S. corporate
property and possibly the collection of information about that corporation in
addition to individual U.S. persons. A full discussion of the corporate legal
issues and intelligence-related legal issues lies beyond the scope of this Article.
However, this scenario highlights the complexities of the legal questions
involved in combatting information warfare.
Another legal problem arises when considering foreign agents who are
U.S. persons. Bluman’s holding is currently limited to foreign individuals.
However, it is entirely foreseeable that an adversary state or non-state actor
would employ U.S. persons in an information warfare campaign. Legislation
designed to combat electoral interference would need to delineate limitations
on their conduct.254
252
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See, e.g., Mike Wendling & Will Yates, NATO Says Viral News Outlet is Part of “Kremlin Misinformation
Machine”, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-38936812
(discussing opposing views on independence of Russian-funded media outlet Sputnik); see also
Andrew Higgins, Effort to Expose Russia’s ‘Troll Army’ Draws Vicious Retaliation, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/world/europe/russia-finland-nato-trolls.html
(reporting on harassment of journalist investigating Russia’s “troll army”).
EUR. PARL. ASS., DOC. 14523, LEGAL CHALLENGES RELATED TO HYBRID WAR AND HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS, at 8 (2018), www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/XRef-DocDetailsEN.asp?fileid=24547 (follow PDF hyperlink) (noting that difficulties of accountability for online
speech and problems attributing the speech of individuals to foreign states makes it challenging to
determine what qualifies as freedom of expression versus foreign electoral interference).
See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a (2017), (listing, among other restrictions, that the government cannot
intentionally target persons who are within the United States or U.S. persons (citizen or LPR), and
any surveillance must be conducted consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the targeting and
minimization procedures detailed in § 1881a(d) and (e)).
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Any effective legislation that would protect the U.S. electoral process
from foreign interference must be able to prohibit certain speech or conduct
by agents of foreign adversaries. Yet, determining who qualifies as an agent
of a foreign state is complicated, and determining who qualifies as an agent
of a non-state actor is even harder. Any legislation created to address
disinformation campaigns would be incomplete without specifying what link
between principal and agent is required to restrict certain free speech rights.
B. Reforming Surveillance Laws
To succeed in the fight against information warfare, the U.S.
Government will likely need to engage in some degree of surveillance of
social media. To do so, it will need to modify its statutes involving
surveillance of Americans’ First Amendment activity. Congress must tread
carefully when doing so in order not to repeat the mistakes of the PATRIOT
Act, a major attempt to modify U.S. surveillance laws after 9/11.
1. Lessons from the PATRIOT ACT
Congress passed the PATRIOT Act shortly after 9/11 “[t]o deter and
punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance
law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”255 The Act
modified prior surveillance laws, setting new conditions under which the
government could electronically monitor communications.256 Newly
legalized surveillance methods soon were applied domestically and were not
used exclusively to combat terrorism. The Act was roundly criticized for
weakening American civil liberties in the name of national security. By 2004,
over 330 communities and 4 states passed resolutions formally objecting to
the PATRIOT Act, primarily because of civil liberties concerns.257
Many critics saw the PATRIOT Act as an overbroad law that gave law
enforcement agencies powers to surveil Americans for reasons having
255
256
257

USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001) [hereinafter
“PATRIOT ACT” or “the Act”].
Nathan C. Henderson, Note, The Patriot Act’s Impact on The Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic
Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179, 179 (2002).
John T. Soma et al., Balance of Privacy vs. Security: A Historical Perspective of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 285, 326–27 (2005) (citing List of Communities that have Passed
Resolutions, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/list-communities-have-passed-resolutions (last
visited Oct. 23, 2019)).
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nothing to do with fighting terrorism.258 The Act was, in fact, used to surveil
Americans for illegal activities other than terrorism.259 Several provisions of
the Act also allegedly violated First Amendment freedoms. For example,
section 214 permitted the government to execute trap and trace orders
against individuals so long as their activities were “not expressly within the
First Amendment.”260 Critics argued that the term “expressly” could be
interpreted narrowly, allowing government surveillance of a broad swath of
speech.261 The Act also altered the primary purpose for surveillance
requirement: requests needed no longer assert that they had the primary
purpose of intelligence gathering, but simply “a significant purpose.”262
Again, this increased the powers of law enforcement to surveil expressive
activity for purposes other than fighting terrorism.
Additionally, the Act modified the Pen Register Act263 to facilitate the
government’s compulsion of online platforms to conduct prospective
envelope surveillance on its behalf, including records of dialing, routing, and
signaling information.264 The government would be able to see websites
visited and subject lines of emails, with the standard of proof being a mere
“relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”265 Critics argued that the
Act abused civil liberties by only requiring minimal judicial review and not
providing clear guidelines on how the intelligence community should avoid
collecting content related to First Amendment Activity.266 Congress
amended some of the Act in response to these and other critiques.
258
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For more discussion of the PATRIOT Act’s flaws, see generally Kyle Welch, The Patriot Act and Crisis
Legislation: The Unintended Consequences of Disaster Lawmaking, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 481, 481 (2015)
(“When faced with [crises], the nation’s democratically elected representatives have used disaster
as fuel to propel previously unacceptable, even unconstitutional laws.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet
Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 607 (2003) (“The
Act’s surveillance provisions proved so controversial that Congress added a sunset provision.”).
See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomm. Records and
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (permitting grant of cell site information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation
involving the illegal sale of contraband pursuant to the combined authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3121
and the Stored Communications Act). The PATRIOT Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3121.
PATRIOT Act § 216.
Soma et al., supra note 257257, at 303 (citing PATRIOT Act § 214).
See id. at 303–04.
PATRIOT Act § 218.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (1986).
PATRIOT Act § 216.
Id.
Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 933, 988 (2002).
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Legislation to help combat information warfare would likely arouse even
more controversy than the PATRIOT Act. Surveillance to fight information
warfare would necessarily involve delving beyond “envelope information”
into the content of electronic communications. In light of Supreme Court
precedent and lessons learned from the PATRIOT Act, legislation that
would increase government surveillance capabilities to fight information
warfare must be carefully crafted to balance First Amendment rights and
national security.
2. Improving Surveillance Laws and the Privacy Act
Legislation that would increase government surveillance capabilities must
be narrowly tailored to achieve a specific national security purpose. The
surveillance process must include checks to ensure that civil liberties are not
violated. However, such checks must not be so onerous as to prevent
agencies acting for a national security purpose from moving quickly to fight
rapid and constantly changing information threats.
First, legislation must be tailored to specific national security concerns.
Unlike the PATRIOT Act, the legislation must not become like a Christmas
tree, where provisions with other purposes are attached without much
connection, for other powers that law enforcement agencies and national
security agencies would like to wield. The legislation must articulate a
specific national security purpose that any related surveillance would
support. For example, legislation could tailor the collection of data related
to U.S. persons’ First Amendment activities to collection related or incidental
to national security and law enforcement efforts to protect U.S. elections
against influence by foreign powers. Legislation must specify which agencies
will conduct that surveillance, and what steps they will need to follow to gain
permission to conduct that surveillance. To avoid previous problems
associated with the Privacy Act, Congress should ensure that the legislation
covers agencies beyond those who traditionally have law enforcement and
intelligence-collection capacities. The legislation might include the DOS,
DHS, and DOJ, given the necessity of a whole-of-government approach to
fighting information warfare. Moreover, the legislation should contain a
provision that allows arms of additional agencies to conduct necessary
electronic surveillance on an expedited basis, without full amendment of the
Act.
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Legislators must build checks into the process to ensure that federal
agencies are accessing U.S. persons’ First Amendment information only for
the aforementioned narrowly tailored national security purposes. The
legislation should also grant the agencies the power to access only the
information necessary to achieve the narrowly tailored and specified national
security purpose. The legislation should require agencies first to research
open-source data on U.S. persons whenever it is available and if time allows
it to do so, given the potential urgency of a national security concern.
Agencies should be required to get a court order or a warrant from a court
of competent jurisdiction to conduct prospective envelope or content
surveillance of Internet communications. A high threshold should be
required to obtain the court order or warrant, along with stringent judicial
review of the government’s application. The court should issue the order
only if the government can provide “specific and articulable facts” showing
reasonable ground to believe that the content of the electronic
communication is relevant and material to an ongoing investigation
supporting the specific national security purpose.267
In this regard, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”)
provides a useful model for allowing surveillance of foreign agents without
unduly infringing on the civil liberties of U.S. persons.268 For a judge to
permit government surveillance under FISA, she must find probable cause
that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and probable
cause that the facility is used by the target.269 The judge may consider the
target’s past activities and any facts and circumstances relating to the target’s
current or future activities.270 However, the judge cannot accept the
government’s assertion that someone is an agent of a foreign power solely
based on activities protected by the First Amendment.271 Because FISA
267
268
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This language is derived from the Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (1986).
See generally Jill I. Goldenziel & Manal Cheema, Protecting First Amendment Rights in the Fight Against
Disinformation: Lessons Learned from FISA, 79 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the civil
liberties protections embedded in FISA should be used and built upon in any legislation that
requires access to U.S. persons’ information to combat information warfare).
50 U.S.C. §1805(a) (2017).
Id. § 1805(b).
Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A); see also United States v. Aziz, 228 F. Supp. 3d 363, 376–77 (M.D. Pa. 2017)
(holding that the judge could rely in part on these activities because the defendant’s conduct
exceeded “the bounds of the First Amendment’s protective sphere”); United States v. Rosen, 447
F. Supp. 2d 538, 549 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that a judge can rely in part on these activities as
long as there is probable cause that the target may be involved in unlawful clandestine activities).
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forces the government to meet specific standards before an order based on
an individual’s First Amendment activities can be issued, FISA’s provisions
(50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885) are not so overly broad that they chill an
individual’s First Amendment rights.272 That said, if the target of the
surveillance is not a U.S. person or her activities are not protected by the
First Amendment, a wiretap will not violate FISA if the target is labeled as a
foreign power based solely on her First Amendment activities.273
A full and informed debate on any legislation or modifications to existing
legislation is a must. This makes it especially important for Congress to act
before a new presidential electoral cycle when the threat of imminent acts of
information warfare could spur hasty legislation. Finally, a sunset clause
within any legislation must be included to prevent adverse, long-reaching
encroachments on civil liberties, especially ones that are unforeseen.
Congress should reform the Privacy Act along similar lines. It should
expand the Act to allow agencies acting for a national security purpose, in
addition to law enforcement agencies or agencies acting for law enforcement
purposes, to access U.S. persons’ communications. Once again, the DOS
and the DHS should be added to the traditional list of law enforcement
agencies, with a clause providing a process to allow the DOD to participate
in exceptional circumstances,274 and for additional agencies to participate
without a revision of the bill. However, appropriate checks should be added
to the process to prevent surveillance powers from becoming too broad. In
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See United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314–15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (asserting that because
the judge, not the Executive branch, makes the finding that the target is truly an agent of a foreign
power, and that FISA admonishes that no U.S. person can be considered an agent solely based on
her First Amendment activities, FISA is not overbroad); see also ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr,
952 F.2d 457, 471–72 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining First Amendment limitations on FISA
investigations).
See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1194–95 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d mem., 729 F.2d
1444 (2d Cir. 1983) and aff’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.
1984) (asserting that because no U.S. person was the target of the surveillance pursuant to FISA,
the First Amendment caveat was not implicated); see also United States v. Sattar, No. 02 CR. 395
JGK., 2003 WL 22137012, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003) (upholding FISA determination of probable
cause against First Amendment challenge based on activities not protected by the First
Amendment).
See Exec. Order No. 12333 § 2.3(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941(Dec. 4, 1981) (permitting intelligence
collection on foreigners within the U.S. but not intelligence collection “undertaken for the purpose
of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons”); see also id. §
2.4 (requiring the IC to “use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United
States or directed against United States persons abroad”).
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light of the potential for chilling speech, lawmakers should revisit the
necessity of the current blanket exemptions for law enforcement and
determine whether court orders and judicial review should be necessary at
some steps in an investigative process.
Any laws allowing surveillance of U.S. persons’ First Amendment
activities must have adequate disclosure provisions. The DOJ’s Digital
Cyber Task Force Report outlines six situations in which information the
Department collects concerning foreign influence operations may be
disclosed to the general public. Three of them are to alert (1) unwitting
recipients of covert support as necessary to assist in countering, (2) online
platforms whose services are used to disseminate propaganda or
disinformation, and (3) the public or other affected individuals, when doing
so outweighs other countervailing concerns.275 The DOJ asserts that
disclosing influence operations to the public is a meaningful way to neutralize
their effectiveness and mitigate their harm. These concepts were
incorporated into Section 90.730 of Title 9 of the Justice Manual.276
Disclosure of activities will only occur when the DOJ can attribute them to
foreign sources with high confidence. However, the DOJ may choose not to
disclose if such a disclosure would be counterproductive, such as
inadvertently amplifying the message.277
These disclosure guidelines should be incorporated into any statute
involving surveillance to fight information warfare. Since disclosure may
interfere with an ongoing investigation, it will not always be possible to
require national security actors to disclose when U.S. persons’ First
Amendment activities are being surveilled. However, agencies should be
encouraged to make such disclosures when possible, especially with the
purpose of actively engaging Americans in the fight against information
warfare.
C. Sanctions
Sanctions may provide some deterrence against electoral interference.
Section 2 of the 2018 Executive Order on Election Interference authorizes

275
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CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16–17.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-90.730 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-990000-national-security#9-90.730.
Id.
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sanctions against entities deemed to have engaged in election interference.278
The Secretary of the Treasury may block their property under U.S.
jurisdiction of foreign agents if they (1) “engaged in, sponsored, concealed,
or otherwise were complicit in foreign interference,” (2) “materially assisted,
sponsored,” or supported the election interference, or (3) “acted or purported
to act for or on behalf of those whose property or property interests were
blocked pursuant to the order.”279 Finally, section 3 allows the White House
to implement sanctions and “any other measures authorized by law” beyond
those who interfered and their facilitators, such as business entities.280 The
Secretaries of State and Treasury will recommend these sanctions to the
President, alongside an assessment of the effect of these sanctions so that
sanctions are “appropriately calibrated to the scope of the foreign
interference identified.”281
Sanctions may be a useful tool for fighting information warfare, and
Congress may wish to consider expanding them. Their effectiveness is
limited, however, by the difficulty of determining the source of election
interference and the scope of that foreign interference. Moreover,
retroactive sanctions like those in the Executive Order are punitive but
inadequate to prevent electoral interference.
D. Fighting Foreign-Sponsored Paid Advertisements
The government can also regulate paid social media advertisements by
foreign actors designed to influence the electoral process, just as it does on
traditional media sites. For example, the government can require that any
paid political advertisements include a clear statement of who paid for or is
disseminating a message. Registration requirements for political users would
be similar to those required for traditional media.
Following Bluman, any advertisement that “is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate” would constitute express advocacy and therefore be prohibited
by the BCRA.282 Extending Bluman’s rationale, other forms of express
advocacy by foreign actors can be prohibited altogether. Foreign-paid
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Exec. Order No. 13,848, 83 Fed. Reg. 179 (Sept. 14, 2018).
Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 3(b).
Id.
Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007).
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advertisements designed to influence the electoral process that fall short of
express advocacy can also be regulated. Such advertisements might be
registered as propaganda and regulated accordingly. Foreign advertisers
might also be required to disclose the source of the advertisement’s funding,
just as other U.S. advertisers are required to do when they post
advertisements on particular electoral issues. Since legislation regulating
paid political advertisements, whether paid for by foreigners or U.S.
nationals, would be political speech and content-based, it must satisfy strict
scrutiny. Such legislation must, therefore, be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.
To satisfy the tailoring prong, legislation regulating paid online political
advertisements must be drafted carefully so as not to be overbroad. The
January 2019 case of Washington Post v. McManus illustrates the difficulties in
creating a narrowly-tailored registration statute.283 In McManus, a federal
district court struck down Maryland’s Online Electioneering Transparency
and Accountability Act (“OETA”) on First Amendment grounds. The
OETA was enacted to help combat events like the 2016 Russian
disinformation campaign. The Act required social media and news sites to
self-publish an ad-buyer’s identity and the total amount paid. The platform
must post this information in a searchable format within forty-eight hours of
the purchase, place it in a “clearly identifiable location” on the platform’s
website, and keep it there for at least one year following the relevant general
election.284
Despite finding that the state had compelling interests in passing the
statute, the court found that the legislation was not narrowly tailored. Citing
Bluman, the court asserted that Maryland had compelling interests in
preventing foreign governments and their nationals from interfering in their
elections, informing voters about the source of online advertisements, and
deterring corruption.285 However, the statute was both over- and underinclusive because it regulated more speech than is necessary and did not
regulate the main tools that foreign operatives used to disrupt the 2016
elections.286 The statute’s publication requirement was most problematic
283
284
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Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019).
Id. at 283.
Id. at 298–99 (citing Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285–86 (D.D.C.
2011)).
Id. at 299.
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because it compelled online platforms to post state-required information on
their websites, “. . . treading on their First Amendment-protected interest in
controlling the content of their own publications.”287 Further, the statute was
redundant and unnecessary since Maryland campaign finance laws already
prescribed less restrictive means of obtaining the same information.288
Moreover, the state inspection requirement was over-inclusive. The
statute covered all online platforms, including news sites. However, no news
site has been identified as having run a single foreign-sourced paid political
advertisement.289 Therefore, the Act was overbroad beyond its purpose of
stopping foreign interference in elections because it included news sites in its
ambit. The requirement also requires the media to enact the government’s
regulatory scheme, which is antithetical to the role of a free press that is
meant to serve as a check on government excesses.290 Finally, the Act did
not advance its purpose. In particular, since the Act placed the burden on
the advertisement’s buyer to notify online publishers, a buyer could withhold
notice. That would, in turn, absolve the publisher from disclosing
information about the advertisement. An advertisement’s buyer might also
provide false information, and the publisher would be protected by the goodfaith provision in the Act.291 The Act’s provisions thus did not target the
foreign efforts that it purported to target and was not well-designed to catch
foreign operatives.292
As of this writing, McManus is the only federal decision on legislation to
regulate paid political advertisements in the wake of the Russian electoral
threat. Several other state legislatures have passed similar legislation or have
it pending.293 McManus is currently being appealed.294 It remains to be seen
whether other courts will follow the Maryland District Court’s approach.
Learning from McManus, future drafters should avoid redundancy in
campaign finance provisions and narrowly tailor the statute to achieving

287
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289
290
291
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Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 303–04.
See Democracy Protection Act, 2018 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 59, pt. JJJ (McKinney) (codified at N.Y.
Elec. §§ 14-100, 14-106 to -107, 14-126); see also 2018 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 304 (West) (amending
state campaign finance laws, including Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17A.005).
Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (D. Md. 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-1132 (Feb. 4,
2019).
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specific goals. A given statute need not address every aspect of the Russian
disinformation campaign; however, it must specify what aspects of
information warfare the statute aims to combat, and how.
Other courts may not share McManus’s concern with requiring news and
social media sites to post a reasonably short state-sponsored disclaimer or list
of funders of paid advertisements, on their sites. To support its reasoning
that such a requirement would violate press freedoms, McManus cited cases
that forbade a state from requiring publishers to print content with which
they did not agree. In our view, a government requirement for a publisher
to print factually neutral information, such as a disclaimer or a list of
advertisers, would not impinge on a publisher’s editorial freedom.295 The
Federal Government requires paid political advertisements on traditional
media to include appropriate disclaimers. To require a different standard
for paid political advertisements online would be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s treatment of social media as similar to traditional media.
Even if the Court were to distinguish social media and traditional media, as
we have suggested above, disclaimers on political advertisements should not
receive different First Amendment protections in online and television or
print contexts.296 If anything, disclaimers on Internet sites should be less
onerous for an online publisher than they are for traditional media outlets,
since space and timing are nearly unlimited commodities online while they
are scarce in television and print media. Thus, states may be able to create
legislation to regulate paid advertisements that are appropriately narrowly
tailored to achieve a specific, compelling state interest.
E. Fighting Fake News
As discussed above, some fake news may be protected political speech.
Jurisprudence does recognize the possibility that false speech by foreigners in
the electoral context may not receive full First Amendment protection. The

295
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The requirement in McManus would seem to be such a factually neutral disclaimer; the court does
not elaborate on its reasoning for conflating a requirement of a publisher to provide facts
contextualizing an advertisement with a requirement that editors publish content with which they
may not agree.
Disclosure is required of “electioneering communications,” which currently only covers broadcast,
cable, or satellite television and does not include internet communications. 11 C.F.R. § 100.26
(2006); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010) (upholding disclaimer
requirements).
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Supreme Court should clarify this standard, and jurisdictions would do well
to attempt to draft laws that would force courts to explore the right doctrinal
balance between First Amendment freedom of speech and preserving the
integrity of the political process.
However, defamation law provides an existing cause of action for those
targeted by fake news stories, especially political candidates.297 If fake news
is “limited to intentional or knowingly false statements, it is reasonable to
conclude that such statements would satisfy the intent requirement for
defamation claims.”298 As discussed earlier, in Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court
held that the heightened “actual malice” standard, as outlined in Sullivan,299
applies to both civil and criminal libel cases. The statute may only punish
false statements if made “with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless
disregard of whether they are true or false.”300 The Court stated that the
case they were considering did not consist solely of private defamation—
which would require only a showing of negligence301—but public defamation
because the statement was directed at a public official.302 When harmful false
publications of fact concern a public figure, the publisher must have acted
with “actual malice.”303 In other words, the claimant must show that a false
publication was made with a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable
falsity.”304 “There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that
the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.”305 Of course, such a statute must not prohibit satire or
parody.306 When considering United States v. Alvarez, it appears to be the case
that “conscious falsehoods that cause legally cognizable harm are not
297
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299
300
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See Joel Timmer, Fighting Falsity: Fake News, Facebook, and the First Amendment, 35 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 669, 683–84 (2017) (explaining that the applicability of defamation law with regards to
public officials is limited to circumstances involving malice).
David O. Klein & Joshua R. Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET L. 7 (2017)
(emphasis in original).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that a public official must present
proof that the defamatory statement was made with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity).
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76–78 (1964).
The private plaintiff must normally establish that the false statement was made to a third party and
it was of such a nature that it harmed or would tend to harm the plaintiff’s reputation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 74.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1988) (finding that the statements were a
parody of a public figure and therefore not published with actual malice).
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protected,” but unintentional false speech is protected even if there is
cognizable harm.307 Where there is consciously false speech with no legally
cognizable harm, however, the speech is protected. Thus, “consciously false
speech turns on an assessment of harm.”308 The speech must be knowingly
or recklessly false and produce some legally cognizable harm to produce a
successful defamation suit.
However, defamation laws have limitations in effectively combatting fake
news or its harm. A person can only pursue defamation claims against fake
news stories about themselves. In the electoral context, for instance,
candidates who are the subject of defamatory fake news can pursue
defamation claims against providers. To illustrate, Hillary Clinton could not
bring a defamation claim against the story that the Pope endorsed Trump,
even if it adversely affected her campaign. And the Pope, who could bring
the claim, may be reluctant to do so for the time and expense involved as
well as the fear of drawing more attention to the story.309 The author of a
defamatory statement may also be anonymous or live outside the jurisdiction
of the United States, further impeding prosecution.310 Finally, a defamation
lawsuit is unlikely to be resolved before the election, so readers will not be
informed of the veracity of the “news” promptly.
Moreover, section 230 of the CDA protects interactive online providers
from defamation claims where the information was “provided by” another
Internet user.311 Under traditional defamation law, a publisher can be liable
for defamatory statements without their knowledge of the statement’s
inclusion.312 But, with section 230, online providers have “federal immunity
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for
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Martin H. Redish & Kyle Voils, False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Understanding the
Implications of the Equivalency Principle, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 792 (2017); see also United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718–19 (2012) (discussing the protection of false speech under the
First Amendment).
Redish & Voils, supra note 307, at 793.
See Timmer, supra note 297, at 685–86 (explaining barriers for defamation plaintiffs).
See Andrea Butler, Note, Protecting the Democratic Role of the Press: A Legal Solution to Fake News, 96
WASH. U. L. REV. 419, 436 (2018) (explaining barriers for defamation plaintiffs).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017); see also Klein & Wueller, supra note 298, at 7 (noting, however, “the
CDA does not afford protection to the original author of a defamatory or otherwise tortious
publication”); Timmer, supra note 297, at 687-88 (discussing the barrier § 230 poses to defamation
plaintiffs).
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing the state of the law
prior to the enaction of the CDA).
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information originating with a third-party user of the service.”313 Thus, if
the website “does not contribute to the development” of the fake news, it
cannot be liable for the defamatory statements posted by third parties.314
Defamation statutes may still provide some utility in fighting fake news.
For a defamation statute to regulate fake news or misinformation, it must
specifically identify the harm “that falls outside what is already
actionable.”315 A statute that did not identify such specific harm would have
the potential to limit First Amendment freedoms.316
F. Fighting Divisive Propaganda
Of the three main tactics of the Russian disinformation campaign,
divisive propaganda is the hardest to fight. As discussed above, much divisive
propaganda is protected by the First Amendment as political speech.
Changing Supreme Court doctrine to allow regulation of foreign speech in
the electoral context, following the suggestions above, will help fight divisive
propaganda. However, laws that restrict government surveillance of the First
Amendment activities of U.S. persons still pose a large hurdle to fighting
divisive propaganda. These laws must be reformed to allow the U.S.
Government to find and prosecute those undermining the U.S. electoral
process while still protecting the civil liberties of U.S. persons.
1. Reforming the Foreign Agent Registration Act
FARA has the potential to help fight information warfare. Given First
Amendment protections, the United States probably cannot ban media
outlets that are overtly sponsored by foreign states—even if they are
disseminating extremist or disruptive propaganda. However, the United
States can identify them as “propaganda vehicles” and require them to
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Id. at 330; see also id. (“[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content—are barred.”).
See Butler, supra note 310, at 433 (noting that “[a]ll federal courts to consider the issue . . . have
followed . . . this precedent”).
See Dallas Flick, Comment, Combatting Fake News: Alternatives to Limiting Social Misinformation and
Rehabilitating Quality Journalism, 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 375, 396 (2017) (discussing the
challenges of creating a law narrow enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny).
Id.
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register under FARA.317 Under FARA, acting as an agent of a foreign power
requires registration and doing so without registration can be criminal.
FARA requires persons who act as agents of foreign principals to make
periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal.318
The agent must also disclose their activities, receipts, and disbursements that
are in support of those activities.319 A willful violator may be subject to fines
and imprisonment.320 If the violator is an alien, they may be subject to
deportation.321 As the Cyber Digital Task Force Report states, “[o]vert
influence efforts by foreign governments . . . may not be illegal, provided they
comply with [FARA].”322 However, FARA also enables the government to
watch companies that register as agents of foreign adversaries more closely
by putting U.S. agencies on notice of their work.
The DOJ has recently stepped up its enforcement efforts against entities
that have not fulfilled their FARA obligations.323 The Department is now
educating prosecutors and agents on how to investigate criminal violations
of FARA, expanding outreach to those who may be required to register, and
compelling registration of those who are not in compliance, including
American agents of Russian state-funded media networks.324 However,
FARA enforcement is historically difficult, given its numerous exceptions and
the difficulty of navigating its broad language.325
Furthermore, the Department has moved to pursue criminal cases. It
unsealed a criminal complaint of conspiracy on October 19, 2018, against
Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, who is alleged to be the chief accountant of
the Russian operations to influence the 2016 presidential election and 2018
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325

See Fried & Polyakova, supra note 233, at 5 (discussing the DOJ’s attempt to register RT as such).
22 U.S.C. §§ 611–21 (2017).
Id. § 612.
Id. § 618(a).
Id. § 618(c).
CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
Id. at 11.
Id.
The exemptions, among others, include those who engage in political activities, act in a public
capacity, engage in certain business activities, engage in academic or scholastic pursuits, lawyers,
and represent the interests of a foreign principle before the U.S. Government. 22 U.S.C. § 613
(2017). But see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE NAT’L SEC.
DIV.’S ENF’T AND ADMIN. OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT (2016) (calling for
better DOJ enforcement of FARA); Katie Benner, Justice Dept. to Step Up Enforcement of Foreign Influence
Laws. N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/us/politics/fara-taskforce-justice-department.html (reporting on increased enforcement of FARA).
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midterm elections.326 The government claimed it had probable cause to
believe that Ms. Khusyaynova violated a criminal conspiracy statute327 and
obstructing enforcement of FARA and the Federal Election Campaign
Act.328 The complaint was released three weeks before the 2018 midterm
election, despite DOJ policy not to take major steps on politically sensitive
matters just before an election.329
FARA remains an avenue requiring legislative reform,330 including the
need for DOJ’s National Security Division to have the authority to compel
the production of records from registrants and updating the Act’s definition
to cover the digital age. Updating FARA is only part of ensuring
transparency as to the identity of foreign agents.
2. Register and Regulate Bots
Legislation to regulate bots can also help fight information warfare.
Congress might consider laws making it illegal for bots to deceive people
about their identity for the purposes of influencing elections. California is
leading the way in this area, passing a law in September of 2018 that makes
it illegal for a person to use a bot:
with the intent to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for the
purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the
communication in order to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods or services
in a commercial transaction or to influence a vote in an election. A person
using a bot shall not be liable under this section if the person discloses that it
is a bot.331

The law further requires a disclosure that is “clear, conspicuous, and
reasonably designed to inform persons with whom the bot communicates or
interacts that it is a bot.”332 It does not impose a duty on service providers of
326
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Victoria Clark et al., Russian Electoral Interference: 2018 Midterms Edition, LAWFARE (Oct. 19, 2018,
7:36 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/russian-electoral-interference-2018-midterms-edition
[hereinafter Russian Electoral Interference].
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018) (criminalizing conduct by which “two or more persons conspire . . . to
defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose” and “one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy”).
Russian Electoral Interference, supra note 326.
Id.
See, e.g., Disclosing Foreign Influence Act, S. 2039, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill would enhance
FARA enforcement and compliance by allowing the DOJ to issue Civil Investigation Demands,
require the DOJ to develop a FARA enforcement strategy, and eliminate the registration exception
created by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.
2018 CAL. STAT. 92 (enacted).
Id.
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online platforms, such as social media sites. If successful, such bot disclosure
laws would help avoid some source-credibility issues in misinformation
campaigns. However, it remains to be seen whether such laws can be
enforced effectively in a rapidly changing online environment.
Bot registration laws might be more effective. A person using a bot to
influence an electoral vote might have to register the bot to do so, alerting
the government or the online platform to the bot’s presence and intended
behavior. Automated bots do not necessarily have First Amendment rights.
However, when a person is behind the bot, First Amendment concerns may
still be implicated in any surveillance of those bots. Since humans control
bots in varying degrees, with some bots nearly autonomous and others
involving substantial human control, regulation of bots falls into a thorny
constitutional gray zone.
3. Prosecute Operatives Who Target the Right to Vote
The United States can also combat Russian information warfare by
investigating and prosecuting operatives who seek to infringe upon U.S.
citizens’ right to vote. Congress can enact legislation criminalizing
information campaigns that are designed to suppress the vote. To ensure
protection for freedom of speech, Congress must carefully define a standard
for distinguishing information campaigns designed to suppress the vote from
other political speech. Congress should require proof of intent to suppress
the vote and identification of a targeted group of voters whose vote a
campaign is designed to suppress. The Fifteenth Amendment, related
constitutional amendments that support the right to vote, and the Voting
Rights Act would support such legislation.333 The legislation would advance
the compelling state interest of protecting the U.S. electoral process against
foreign interference. These constitutional amendments forbid state action
that would suppress the right to vote, not private action. However, state
inaction that allowed suppression of the right to vote would run counter to
the spirit of these amendments when such state action is possible.
Criminalizing disinformation campaigns targeting the voting process
would send a powerful signal to U.S. enemies and those acting on their
behalf, including U.S. persons. The existence of criminal laws against
disinformation campaigns that target the right to vote may cause trolls and
333

See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (2017) (protecting the individual right to vote in different ways).
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others to refuse to participate in Russian disinformation campaigns.
Sanctions on or punishment of those who disobey the laws will provide a
further deterrent. The existence of laws criminalizing private voter
suppression would also signal to the American public that voter suppression
will not be tolerated. Such laws will also signal that the Federal Government
seeks to encourage voting by African Americans and other historically
marginalized groups. If such encouragement increases voter turnout,
democratic values will prevail over attempted foreign interference.
4. Employing and Improving Counterspeech
As discussed above, the counterspeech doctrine rests on a shaky
intellectual foundation when considering what we now know about human
psychology and the modern marketplace of ideas.334 Since news consumers
are likely unable to gauge the validity of the reporting properly,
counterspeech may do little to ensure that truth prevails or improve the
quality of democratic decision-making.335
Counterspeech may still be a valuable tool in counterpropaganda efforts
under certain conditions. More research is needed to determine how best to
muster government resources in support of useful counterspeech efforts to
fight information warfare. Also, the U.S. Government must be careful not
to get into the business of determining what is true and what is false. If
disinformation exists about government programs themselves, the United
States is free to refute it. The government might counter falsities about access
to elections or voter registration, for example. However, if, for instance, fake
news is being spread about political candidates, the government must not be
the arbiter of whether that news is true or false so as not to censor speech.
Based on the above analysis, U.S. counterspeech efforts should avoid the
firehose approach and carefully target programs toward its audience. The
United States would do well to promote the importance of assessing the
credibility of news sources and warn consumers before misinformation
occurs or immediately thereafter. This would help combat the problem of
the resilience of first impressions. The United States should also make and
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See Ho & Schauer, supra note 103, at 1167–75 (examining human psychology and the marketplace
of ideas). See generally MARI J. MATSUDA, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story,
in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 17, 48 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
Napoli, supra note 1, at 82.
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repeat public announcements dispelling political statements that are
disinformation in order to make the public familiar with the truth. However,
the United States must be careful to frame its retractions in such a way as not
to repeat an original false news story and breed familiarity with it. The
United States should also develop correct counternarratives after falsities are
removed, both to elevate the truth and to ensure that consumers understand
how to avoid falsehoods in the future.336 In engaging in this messaging, it is
critical that the U.S. Government does so with attribution, so it is clear to
recipients who is the source of information.337
Most importantly, the United States must be proactive and work to stop
information warfare at its source.338 The Pandora’s box of false news can
cause irreparable damage from the moment it is opened. Falsehoods may
not even become entirely apparent until long after the speech is made and
the damage is done.
For this reason, counterspeech efforts must work toward removing the
sources of false speech themselves. Counterspeech efforts must focus on
identifying, and training others to identify, fake news and fake news outlets
and exposing or eradicating them. Geltzer and Kupchan suggest a U.S.
Government-sponsored “information campaign” to make the public aware
of Russian information warfare.339 They argue that greater awareness that
the Kremlin is deliberately seeking to pit Americans against themselves can
help make the public less susceptible to manipulation.340 Similarly, Joseph
Thai argues for a K–12 media literacy curriculum to teach students to
evaluate the quality and credibility of sources.341 More research is needed to
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Paul & Matthews, supra note 25, at 10.
The U.S. Government has always put forth its own messaging, with attribution, e.g., agency social
media accounts and counter-messaging efforts abroad, per statutes like Smith-Mundt. See, e.g., 22
U.S.C. §§ 1431–1442(a) (2018).
Paul & Matthews, supra note 25, at 10.
Joshua Geltzer & Charles Kupchan, Opinion, What Counterterrorism Can Teach Us About Thwarting
Russian Disinformation, WASH. POST: DEMOCRACYPOST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/02/22/what-counterterrorism-can-teach-us-about-th
warting-russian-disinformation/.
Id. U.S. efforts to counter Soviet propaganda during the Cold War might be useful to draw on. See
generally Ashley Deeks et al., Addressing Russian Influence: What Can We Learn From U.S. Cold War
Counter-Propaganda Efforts?, LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
addressing-russian-influence-what-can-we-learn-us-cold-war-counter-propaganda-efforts
(discussing the range of strategies the U.S. used to combat Soviet propaganda).
Thai, supra note 68, at 319.
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determine whether these efforts are effective at promoting a well-informed
democratic populace.342
a. The Revised Smith-Mundt Act
The United States recently modified its laws to allow the DOS to conduct
more foreign-directed counterspeech. Before 2012, the effectiveness of the
U.S. Government’s response to disinformation campaigns was hindered by
the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948,343 also called
the Smith-Mundt Act. Congress initially enacted the Smith-Mundt Act to
counter the worldwide communist propaganda released by the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. It outlined the United States’ plan to “promote a
better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase
mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the
people of other countries.”344 The Act permitted the U.S. Government to
disseminate such messages abroad.345 However, the Act prohibited the
dissemination of U.S. influence information to U.S. persons, or within the
United States.346 As with the Privacy Act, Congress wanted to resist parallels
drawn between Soviet propaganda efforts and U.S. actions.347 Therefore,
Congress designed restrictions to prevent foreign-bound information from
being distributed or accessible to the American public.348
In 2012, Congress amended the Smith-Mundt Act, recognizing the
impossibility of restricting Americans from accessing information designated
for foreign audiences in the Internet age. Congress removed the domestic
dissemination ban, thereby allowing government material produced for
overseas consumption to be made available to the American public.349 Both
342
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See Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1095 (discussing the “surprisingly few scientific answers” to
questions about fake news and its impact); Timmer, supra note 297, at 705 (describing Facebook’s
Journalism Project).
22 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1442(a) (2017).
Id.
Weston R. Sager, Note, Apple Pie Propaganda? The Smith-Mundt Act Before and After the Repeal of the
Domestic Dissemination Ban, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 519 (2015).
See id. (arguing a de facto ban existed).
See Allen W. Palmer & Edward L. Carter, The Smith-Mundt Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An
Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 11 (2006)
(quoting Senator Edward Zorinsky, “[t]he American taxpayer certainly does not need or want his
tax dollars used to support U.S. Government propaganda”).
Sager, supra note 345, at 519.
Id. at 528.
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the Senate and the House passed the amendment in late 2012,350 and on
January 3, 2013, President Obama signed the legislation into law.351
The amended Smith-Mundt Act provides the DOS with an improved
tool to fight information warfare through counterspeech. The DOS is now
able to target diaspora communities susceptible to the anti-American
propaganda streaming into the United States.352 The amendment was
designed to include other checks to ensure that the U.S. Government still
does not propagandize its people in a manner comparable to the former
Soviet Union.353 While U.S. persons can now access and judge State-created
propaganda, the DOS cannot aim to influence U.S. public opinion directly.
For example, programming comes from the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (“BBG”), which is independent of the DOS and known for its
excellence in journalism.354 The DOS and the BBG specifically355 may not
disseminate their materials to U.S. citizens on their own volition but may
only make them “available” to those who wish to access them.356 The DOS
and the BBG also may not create programming intended for a domestic
audience or broadcast programming within the United States before
disseminating it abroad.357 In other words, although the DOS and the BBG
may broadcast their programming within the United States, the American
people can be neither the intended nor the initial audience.358 The most
meaningful restriction on the domestic dissemination is likely the DOS’s
appropriations bill, which contains a provision prohibiting the agency from
disseminating “propaganda” within the United States without the
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. § 1078 (2013).
See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on H.R.
4310 (Jan. 3, 2013) (announcing signature of the authorization act).
Rebecca A. Keller, Influence Operations and the Internet: A 21st Century Issue 11 (Feb. 17, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1018557.pdf).
See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, The Case for American Propaganda, FOREIGN POLICY (July 17, 2013, 10:35 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/17/the-case-for-american-propaganda/.
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS, BBG STRATEGIC PLAN 2018-2022, INFORMATION
MATTERS: IMPACT AND AGILITY IN U.S. INTERNATIONAL MEDIA (2018), https://www.usagm.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/BBG-Strategic-Plan-2018-2022_FINAL.pdf.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. § 1077 (2012).
Sager, supra note 345, at 529.
22 U.S.C. § 1461–1a(a) (2013) (clarifying that the DOS and the BBG cannot use funds “to influence
public opinion in the United States”). However, the DOS or BBG may communicate, “either
directly or indirectly,” regardless of whether “a United States domestic audience is or may be
thereby exposed to program material.” Id. § 1461-1a(b).
Sager, supra note 345, at 532.

November 2019]

THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS?

153

authorization of Congress.359
The United States Government
Accountability Office defines propaganda as (1) self-aggrandizing, (2) purely
partisan, or (3) covert.360 Critics argue that these restrictions are insufficient
to ensure that U.S. persons are not propagandized. For example, U.S.
Government programs can easily be misappropriated and rebroadcast by
individuals, regardless of the audience for which the programming was
designed.361
Moreover, even the most innocent DOS or BBG programming could be
considered covert propaganda if, without congressional approval, it is
“circulated as the ostensible position of parties outside the agency”362
through “surreptitious means.”363
Therefore, if the unattributed
programming is impossible to verify or activities merely influence public
emotions, such as by placing the U.S. flag behind a government
spokesperson, government agencies may legally distribute it.364 Scholar
Weston Sager concludes that an agency violates the covert propaganda
prohibition if the intended audience cannot ascertain the proper source of
the government-produced materials.365
The 2012 amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act was a necessary tool to
allow the government to fight information warfare. Given modern
technology, any efforts by the U.S. Government to distribute information
risk misappropriation. The government will have to develop tactics, legal
and otherwise, to avoid misappropriation of its propaganda. It will also need
to continue to comply with other restrictions on intelligence collection and
privacy, as discussed above.

359

360

361
362
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365

See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7055, 125 Stat. 786, 1243–
44 (2011) (restricting any appropriation from the Act from being used for propaganda purposes
without Congressional authorization).
KEVIN R. KOSAR, PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE
AGENCY ACTIVITIES 6 (2005); 1 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-197 (3d ed. 2004) (describing how
appropriation acts commonly prohibit the use of funds for propaganda, which is often defined
“though administrative interpretation”).
Sager, supra note 345, at 532–33.
Id. (citing OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 348, at 4-202).
KOSAR, supra note 360, at 7.
Id.
Office of Nat’l Drug Control Pol., B-303495, 2005 WL 21443, at *4 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 4, 2005);
Sager, supra note 333, at 534.
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b. Expanding Counterterror Counterspeech
Some counterspeech efforts used to fight terror might be expanded to
combat information warfare. The State Department’s Global Engagement
Center (“GEC”) was established in April 2016, under Executive Order
13721.366 The GEC’s original mission was to track terrorist propaganda and
disinformation, to develop consistent anti-terrorist messaging across
government agencies, and to work with other governments and grassroots
organizations to fight information warfare abroad.367 The Center used social
media to micro-target users vulnerable to radicalization.368
The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) expanded
GEC’s mission to include countering the adverse effects of disinformation.369
It also included a Privacy Act authorization for research and data analysis of
foreign disinformation and communications.370 In 2016 and 2017, Congress
authorized the GEC to receive $120 million under the respective NDAAs to
coordinate government-wide efforts to counter Russian and Chinese
propaganda.371 While the Center was underfunded during Rex Tillerson’s
tenure as Secretary of State, bipartisan backlash pushed funding to the
GEC.372 These funds have been dispersed to research disinformation tactics;
support the counter-disinformation efforts of journalists, online influencers,

366
367

368

369
370
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372

Exec. Order No. 13,721, 81 Fed. Reg.14,685 (Mar. 17, 2016).
Issie Lapowsky, The State Department’s Fumbled Fight Against Russian Propaganda, WIRED (Nov. 22,
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/the-state-departments-fumbled-fight-against-russian-propa
ganda/.
Id.; see also Joby Warrick, How A U.S. Team Uses Facebook, Guerrilla Marketing to Peel Off Potential ISIS
Recruits, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/bait-and-flip-us-team-uses-facebook-guerrilla-marketing-to-peel-off-potential-isis-recruits
/2017/02/03/431e19ba-e4e4-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html (describing measures taken
by the U.S. Government to use social media to combat extremism).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2546, § 1287
(2017).
Id. §1287(b)(10); see also Gardiner Harris, State Dept. Was Granted $120 Million to Fight Russian Meddling.
It Has Spent $0, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/
europe/state-department-russia-global-engagement-center.html (describing the allocation of funds
for fighting disinformation).
See Harris, supra note 370.
Robbier Gramer & Elias Groll, State Department Ramps Up War Against Foreign Propaganda, FOREIGN
POLICY (Feb. 7, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/07/with-new-appointment-statedepartment-ramps-up-war-against-foreign-propaganda/ (noting that Lea Gabrielle now heads the
GEC); see also John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018); Polyakova & Fried, supra note 4, at 8–9.

November 2019]

THE NEW FIGHTING WORDS?

155

and fact-checkers; and develop new technology to combat disinformation.373
The GEC’s impact remains to be seen.
G. Regulating Online Platforms and Social Media
The Internet and social media platforms act as important fora for free
speech and expression. Accordingly, any attempts to regulate online
platforms and social media will raise First Amendment concerns, despite
their status as private entities. Eric Posner goes so far as to assert that “any
law that sought to blunt the force of Russian propaganda by controlling its
distribution by Internet companies is unconstitutional.”374 He argues that
because Supreme Court doctrine recognizes the right to receive information,
free of government interference, censorship of Russian propaganda would
not survive First Amendment scrutiny. However, Posner concludes by
suggesting that the 2016 election demonstrates the drawbacks of an
“unfettered ‘marketplace of ideas.’”375 Although the United States must
respond to the danger of Russian and terrorist propaganda on social media,
constitutional law serves as an obstacle. Despite the significant constitutional
challenges involved, some government regulation of online platforms and
social media may be permissible and appropriate to fight information
warfare.
1. Hurdles to Regulating Online Platforms and Social Media
Some scholars have proposed making social media companies liable for
illegal content posted by their users. David Howard, for example, has
proposed holding information and social media companies responsible if
their algorithms push false information for reasons of profit.376 He also
proposes fining social media companies for knowingly failing to remove
illegal content.377

373
374

375
376
377

Polyakova & Fried, supra note 4, at 8–9.
Eric Posner, Are Russian Trolls Protected by the First Amendment?, ERIC POSNER (Feb. 17, 2018),
http://ericposner.com/are-russian-trolls-protected-by-the-first-amendment/; see also Timmer,
supra note 297, at 684 (noting that First Amendment protections for political speech and false speech
make it difficult for a law targeting fake news to survive strict scrutiny).
Posner, supra note 374.
Howard, supra note 97, at 1375.
Id.
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However, such proposals raise several major constitutional concerns.
One concern is that requiring online platforms to be responsible for the
content of their users’ postings might qualify as collateral censorship. The
more the U.S. Government is entangled with voluntary self-regulation of
online platforms, the more the First Amendment becomes an issue. An
online platform’s behavior might constitute state action in certain
circumstances, and therefore raise obligations under the First
Amendment.378 For example, in upholding online platform immunity under
section 230 of the CDA,379 the Ninth Circuit recognized the congressional
purpose as partly to serve as free speech protection for users.380 The court
expressed concern with collateral censorship: if the government threatens to
hold an online platform liable and the online platform then censors its users,
the government would be partially responsible for limiting users’ speech.381
Imposing an obligation on social media companies for illegal content
posted by its users would be radical in the context of prior Supreme Court
precedent protecting both true and false speech.382 Few circumstances
exist—and few should exist—in which the government is permitted to be the
arbiter of what is true and what is false. If the government requires social
media companies to do so on its behalf, that will violate the First
Amendment. If social media companies operate independently to prohibit
disinformation, the First Amendment is not implicated. However, if the
government imposed some standard of care on online platforms to help
combat disinformation, that would be a gray constitutional area. It could
also be the beginning of a slippery slope with dangerous consequences for
free speech. Technology companies tend to be risk-averse, especially if

378
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380
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See Klonick, supra note 94, at 1611 (questioning whether the Packingham decision opens the door for
argument that social media platforms “perform quasi-municipal functions”).
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2003).
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that the policy objectives are “(1)
to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media; [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation”).
Id.; see also Klonick, supra note 94, at 1608 (discussing the Zeran court’s concern of creating “collateral
censorship” by holding Facebook liable for its users’ speech).
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion) (ruling that the Stolen
Valor Act was in violation of the First Amendment because it constituted a content-based restriction
on free speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that damages cannot be
awarded for defamatory falsehood unless actual malice is shown).
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government sanctions are at play. Thus, holding social media companies
liable for illegal content could lead to overbroad regulation or censorship of
legitimate speech, especially political speech.383
Additionally, upon receiving notice of the potentially illegitimate speech,
the company would have to engage in the resource-intensive inquiry as for
whether or not the speech must be taken down. Censoring the speech would
likely be less costly than being held liable, as not censoring allegedly illegal
content may risk expensive litigation and adverse judgments.384 The fear of
“whether [the truth] can be proved in court or . . . the expense of having to
do so” would encourage such collateral censorship.385
The spectrum of censorship arising from liability may range from
mistakes to collateral censorship to even the prohibition of entire categories
of speech on the site that produce higher risks of liability.386 It could also lead
to chilling speech by social media users, who currently operate in an
environment where they can freely post anything and have it instantaneously
shared around the world. If social media companies were to be held liable
for their users’ speech, users might hesitate to post or shrink away from using
social media. Finally, such a policy could also undermine the concept that
counterspeech is the primary solution to false speech, as advanced in Sullivan
and Alvarez.
2. Avenues for Regulating Online Platforms and Social Media
Requiring online platforms to act as censors is constitutionally
problematic for other reasons. Corporations, after all, have First
Amendment rights of their own.387 The government would not be able to
compel social media companies to advance its own message or restrict the
speech of users on its behalf.
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BENKLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 362; Jamie Fly et al., Fake News, Free Speech, and Foreign Influence:
The Smart Way the U.S. Can Combat Disinformation, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Mar. 2018),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Disinformation-Brief-March-2018.pdf.
Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice,
94 CAL. L. REV. 833, 858 n.172 (2006) (arguing that “preserving free speech online requires costly
investigation, legal analysis, and uncertain liability,” if § 230 is read narrowly, which in turn suggests
that “reasonable actors will immediately remove [flagged] speech without regard to the merits of
the notification”).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
Vulnerable, unpopular speech is most at risk here.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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However, some regulations on online platforms might be feasible. Social
media companies might be legally regulated as sellers of a customer service.
Social media companies trumpet their ability to provide “community.” In
this sense, their services are much more akin to a gym or a café than to a
media company.
The governance of these companies over their
communities can be likened to the regulation of a corporate restaurant chain
or chain of gyms. Just like public accommodations can be regulated by the
government to ensure that they do not violate the constitutional rights of
those who are allowed inside, so too can social media. Just like the
government can restrict who buys a gun, so too can the government restrict
who is allowed on social media sites. And just like the government can police
illegal activity in a private establishment, so too can it police illegal behavior
on social media. While access to social media may be difficult to restrict postPackingham, statutes narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest
might be acceptable, so long as they do not burden more speech than
necessary. Packingham also may not apply to the rights of non-U.S. persons
or bots to access social media.
By regulating social media like other service providers, the government
can solve some of the problems it has encountered in fighting information
warfare. Social media companies could be held liable for allowing their
platforms to be used for activities that undermine the integrity of the voting
process since voting is a constitutional right and an act of expression. Any
actions designed or motivated by the desire to suppress voter turnout would
be of particular constitutional concern. Social media companies might be
required to notify the government of such activities, although such a
requirement could be construed as compelling speech by those companies.
The government can also require that social media companies be held liable
if they knew or should have had reason to know that a user was trying to
disrupt elections on their sites. Narrowly tailored statutes targeted to the
purpose of ensuring that social media users do not disrupt elections could
allow the government to regulate social media constitutionally.
Social media companies could be required to conduct verification checks
for all users who wish to join their sites to determine whether they are humans
or bots. The government might also require users to regularly renew their
verifications, perhaps randomly, and require repeated verifications for those
who engage in behavior that suggests they are trying to disrupt elections.
Social media companies could be held liable for failing to report bots who
engage in activities disruptive to the electoral process.
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Technology companies might also be required to notify their users and
the U.S. Government that their sites are disseminating foreign
propaganda.388 Further, social media websites might also be required to
disseminate information to their users about spotting and reporting fake news
and posts designed to disrupt the U.S. electoral process. As discussed above,
scholars have identified education campaigns about information warfare as
an important part of the fight against it. Social media companies could be
required to disseminate information to their users upon joining a social
network and at regular intervals before and during electoral cycles. The
government could require online platforms like Facebook and Google to
provide specific information to its consumers to judge the materials posted.389
If the online platform does not provide information, the online platform
could be held liable for contempt or liable at a reckless standard. Even if
Congress cannot legislate such a requirement, the government might ask
social media companies to educate their users voluntarily. Reminding users
of their important role in safeguarding the U.S. electoral process might
generate a sense of online civic responsibility that would reinforce bonds
within a social network, to which social media companies might subscribe.
Facebook already regularly reminds its users to vote and to register to do so.
Other scholars have suggested additional useful tactics for responding to
the Russian disinformation threat. Geltzer and Kupchan suggest adapting
the framework of tracing and blocking terrorist financing to the current
threat of information warfare.390 They suggest legislation that would
criminalize the acceptance of assistance from a foreign government that is
aimed at influencing elections. For example, if a presidential candidate’s
campaign manager affirmatively responded to a Kremlin email offering to
wage a disinformation campaign targeting his opponent in the 2020 election,
that would constitute a criminal act. The goal would be to make social media
companies and other sites more accountable, with a “know your source”
requirement comparable to the “know your customer” requirement.391
Howard argues that the government might also require online platforms to
388
389

390
391

See Geltzer & Kupchan, supra note 339 (suggesting requirement for source identification in social
media).
However, social media companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Google “seem reticent to fully
cooperate” and provide complete and usable data that will facilitate counter-disinformation efforts.
Polyakova & Fried, supra note 4, at 14–15.
Geltzer & Kupchan, supra note 339.
Id.
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modify their user agreements to limit disinformation, and to allow users to
flag false or suspicious content.392
The ambiguous First Amendment status of online platforms and social
media providers presents challenges for regulating them without chilling
speech and trammeling on First Amendment rights. Legislation will be more
likely to be constitutional if it puts the onus on users to safeguard their First
Amendment rights, such as encouraging users to report suspected
disinformation or requiring users to register bots. The more legislation puts
the social media company in the position of a censor, the less likely it is to
pass constitutional muster. Requiring a social media company to report
suspicious behavior by its users presents a constitutional gray area, so
legislation in this regard must be very narrowly tailored. Regulating online
platforms as a category of service providers similar to other providers of
places of communal gathering might show the most potential for preventing
false speech designed to disrupt the electoral process.
3. “Voluntary” Actions by Online Platforms
Because regulation of online platforms and social media outlets presents
constitutional difficulties, and because of the need for rapid action to protect
voters against disinformation, some have proposed that online platforms
voluntarily take steps to combat information warfare. Governments and the
public have pushed social media platforms to voluntarily commit to actively
policing their networks for fake news and disinformation, and to identify,
label, and even suspend the botnets responsible for its creation and
dissemination.
Online platforms have financial incentives to cooperate with
governments that regulate their businesses. Voluntary compliance with
government requests to help fight information warfare may help these
companies avoid future regulation. Moreover, online platforms are
accountable to their users and responsive to user demands and political
pressures. Thus, online platforms have begun to take actions to combat

392

Howard, supra note 97, at 1375; see also Timmer, supra note 297, at 699–700 (describing a change
implemented by Facebook whereby its users can flag content that may be fake).
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information warfare. Political pressure393 and social responsibility394 have
encouraged online platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Google, to alter
their platforms to combat fake news.395
Some commentators push for online platforms to serve as “de facto
Internet police” because it is less costly and more efficient than for the
government to do so.396 They have called for online platforms to monitor
subscriber conduct, remove risky subscribers from the network, report
instances of computer crime on their sites, build constraints that
automatically monitor and prevent illegal activity, and preserve data for law
enforcement investigation.397 However, all of these activities raise free
speech concerns. If online platforms begin to act as Big Brother, users’
speech will be chilled. Moreover, private companies tend to be risk-averse.
As described earlier, online platforms may err in favor of over-censorship
because of the difficulties in distinguishing protected from unprotected
speech.398
The Federal Government could pressure online platforms to control the
speech of their users through a “good corporate citizen” program, which
requests online platforms to “voluntarily remove questionable content or
alert government authorities to its existence.”399 Although the government
lacks the legal authority to compel the removal of content, online platforms
393
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See, e.g., Cecelia Kang et al., Tech Executives Are Contrite About Election Meddling, but Make Few Promises
on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes. com/2017/10/31/us/
politics/facebook-twitter-google-hearings-congress.html (reporting on social media executives
appearing on capitol Hill to acknowledge their role in Russia’s propaganda campaign).
See, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 4, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.facebook.com/
zuck/posts/10104380170714571 (discussing a “personal challenge” to focus on Facebook’s role in
“protecting our community from abuse and hate” and “defending against interference by nation
states”).
See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter Is Looking for Ways to Let Users Flag Fake News, Offensive Content,
WASH. POST (June 29, 2017, 3:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2017/06/29/twitter-is-looking-for-ways-to-let-users-flag-fake-news; How Google Fights
Disinformation, GOOGLE (Feb. 2019), https://storage.googleapis.com/gweb-uniblog-publishprod/documents/How_Google_Fights_Disinformation.pdf.
Chris Montgomery, Note, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet and the Age of Terrorism?: The
Secret Weakening of a Venerable Doctrine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 141, 165 (2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal
Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1095–96 (2001) (positing that “it may be more efficient
for third parties to stop cybercrime from happening rather than to rely on prosecution”).
See Id. at 1096–97 (outlining five strategies Internet Service Providers can use to combat fake news
and other cybercrimes).
Montgomery, supra note 396, at 166.
Id. at 168.
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may choose to remove content upon request instead of risking poor relations
with the government. For example, under the CDA, online platforms are
immune from civil liability for any “Good Samaritan” blocking or screening
of “objectionable” material.400
Such actions by online platforms are complicated by the undefined legal
status of online platforms, including social media websites, as media, service
providers, and critical parts of the “new public square.” Private companies
ordinarily do not have First Amendment obligations toward their users.
They certainly do not have a First Amendment burden to remove false and
inciting speech. However, social media websites have more power to censor
and impose restrictions on speech than many governments. Facebook can
ban what it considers to be hate speech in its terms of service, but the U.S.
Government cannot. Scholars have thus argued that self-censorship by
social media companies causes First Amendment concerns. Some argue that
social media platforms are a modern form of the press and, therefore, are
generally protected by the First Amendment.401 To do otherwise would
contravene the First Amendment because it would inhibit legitimate
democratic discourse.402 Regardless of whether social media should be
likened to the press, the public square, or something else entirely, the practice
of censorship on social media “sits awkwardly” with traditional American
values of open political debate and free expression.403
Moreover, as noted above, social media sites function as communities
with quasi-governmental structures. They also provide important venues for
free speech, expression, and discourse. Collateral censorship concerns may
be raised if online platforms engage in a quasi-government function. A fine
line may exist between censorship and voluntary action if the government
puts strong pressure on online platforms to remove content against their will.
For these reasons, any voluntary actions by online platforms should also
comport with First Amendment principles. Online platforms should
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47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)–(B) (2017).
Rachel E. VanLandingham, Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material Support to Terrorism, and
Muzzling the Modern Press, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 48 (2017) (making the case for protection from §
2339B, i.e., material support, criminal prosecution for allowing terrorists to post on their sites).
Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964)).
Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton, Digital Counterterrorism: Fighting Jihadists Online, BIPARTISAN
POLICY CTR. 12 (Mar. 2018), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPCNational-Security-Digital-Counterterrorism.pdf.
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consider the primacy of political speech and the importance of political
discourse on their platforms when considering any voluntary actions.
Rather than attempting to regulate the truth, technology companies
might endeavor to identify “when ‘news’ sources are confined to a very
narrow group of self-referring sources—a hallmark of disinformation—so
that users are aware that [content] may be suspect.”404 Online platforms
would not necessarily seek to suspend or censor the accounts, but act to alert
their users about the dangers and warning signs of disinformation and
radicalization. Clarifying the source of the material is in line with First
Amendment principles as speaker identity can greatly impact trust factors,
such as credibility, knowledge, motivation, and reliability.405 Furthermore,
foreign nations do not possess First Amendment interests, so “compelling the
disclosure of their identity would not impose any speaker-side harms to offset
the benefits of disclosure to listeners.”406
One promising, data-driven tactic for countering divisive propaganda is
Google’s Jigsaw. This project, premised on counterspeech, was initially
developed to thwart terrorist communications.407 Jigsaw redirects YouTube
users who search for radicalizing content toward persuasive, “user-created,
de-radicalizing content.”408 The benefits of this approach are several-fold.
First, consumers perceive online platform content as more authentic than
U.S. Government messages.409 Second, the data-driven approach can better
identify hidden, counter-argument content410 that resembles propaganda but
was not designed to do so directly. Examples might include citizen
journalism and documentaries and content featuring religious figures who
refute extremist narratives.411 Third, these approaches do not depend on the
government’s ability to apply regional, linguistic, cultural, or religious
404
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Robert D. Blackwill & Philip H. Gordon, Containing Russia, Again: An Adversary Attacked the United
States—It’s Time to Respond, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/
article/containing-russia-again-adversary-attacked-united-states-its-time-respond.
Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 117, 124 n.31
(2018) (“[L]isteners often use the speaker’s identity as a proxy for the message’s quality and
credibility.”).
Thai, supra note 68, at 318.
Kean & Hamilton, supra note 403, at 22.
Id.
Id.
See THE REDIRECT METHOD, A BLUEPRINT FOR BYPASSING EXTREMISM 5 (last accessed Oct. 23,
2019), https://redirectmethod.org/downloads/RedirectMethod-FullMethod-PDF.pdf.
Id. at 6.
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expertise to determine the credibility of messages. Instead, real-world user
behavior can be used to determine which messages are persuasive at
radicalization or counter-radicalization.412 Other data-driven projects, such
as those run by Graphika, Oxford University’s Computational Propaganda
Project, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, YouTube’s
AlgoTransparency, and Public Editor, are helpful in tracking and exposing
disinformation that social media companies can remove.413
Flagging and the voluntary removal of content as an avenue to counter
propaganda may be more coercive to users than countermessaging or
redirection, but would better conform to First Amendment requirements and
be more palatable to the companies’ user bases.414 However, social media
companies run a similar credibility risk to that faced by the government.
Social media corporations’ use of their users’ data and psychological profiling
has caused many traditional media outlets, researchers, and users to view
their editorial interventions with skepticism.415
Another solution that social media companies are currently trying is
signaling source quality. Facebook, for example, has begun to surface factchecked articles next to disputed ones,416 add “trust indicators” to include
information about the publication, corrections, and ethics policies,417 and
crowdsourced the trust rankings of news sources to its userbase.418 Some
social media sites have also excluded bot activity from measures of “trending”
content.419 Platforms have also tried limiting bots and “cyborgs” from
spreading news.420 Although malign actors may be able to design
countermeasures to these efforts, social media companies will have incentives
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Trust, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
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Lazer et al., supra note 27, at 1096.
Id. at 1096. Lazer et al. define cyborgs as “users who automatically share news from a set of sources,
with or without reading them.” Id.
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to keep combatting them if users value the credibility of their chosen
platforms. These are positive steps, but more research is needed to evaluate
their effectiveness.
The government can carefully pressure social media companies to
provide an editorial function in regulating what is allowed on the sites,
although these actions raise a concern of censorship. The government
employed such tactics in combatting foreign terrorist groups. The DOJ’s
Cyber Digital Task Force Report foresees the FBI assisting in providers’
voluntary efforts to identify and combat malign foreign influence operations,
just as it has in addressing terrorist use of social media.421 Upon government
request, in many of their “Terms of Service,” online platforms explicitly
prohibit posts promoting violent or terrorist acts. The government has
pressured social media companies to police their users’ accounts for terroristrelated activity.422 Social media companies have thus taken some editorial
control via terms of service or user agreements that allow them to remove
posts or delete accounts of terrorists or their supporters.423 Some
corporations, like Twitter, have suspended or blocked hundreds of thousands
of terrorist accounts—often before their first post.424 Suspending proextremist social media accounts does not appear to sufficiently prevent new,
pro-extremist group accounts from sprouting up.425 But, although the
terrorists may quickly recreate the accounts, these “returning accounts” do
not regain their previous level of traction. From February 2016 to March
2017, there was a dramatic decline of 76% in the number of tweets from
English-language Islamic State sympathizers “from the most active to the
least active week.”426 The policy of suspending accounts, however, may have
other problems. Beyond free speech issues and the loss of intelligence
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gathering opportunities, suspensions may cause further radicalization by
pushing extremists into insular online communities without moderate voices.
Similar efforts by online platforms, whether coerced or voluntary, might
be useful in combatting information warfare. However, they make the online
platform, not the consumer of information, the arbiter of truth. Although
such actions may not violate First Amendment freedoms, they raise concerns
about chilling speech and censorship that run contrary to First Amendment
ideals.
4. The Utility of Self-Regulation?
As a tool for combatting information warfare, voluntary self-regulation
by online platforms has many inherent flaws. Online platforms’ efforts to
remove posts or cooperate are likely to be inconsistent.427 Voluntary selfregulation depends on the willingness of those at the helm of a social media
company at any given time to comply. New social media companies sprout
up rapidly, making it difficult for the government to work with all of them.
Smaller companies may not have the capacity to monitor users’ accounts
closely. Self-regulation also raises the problem of the proverbial fox guarding
the henhouse. Social media companies have every incentive to look like they
are cooperating with the government while plausibly claiming deniability
when their users misbehave. Private companies do not provide U.S. persons
with the same procedural safeguards and transparency as the government
would require for infringement on speech.428 Encouraging companies to
censor content without any form of due process removes transparency and
could chill speech.
More research is needed to determine the conditions under which
voluntary self-regulation by online platforms and their users can fight
information warfare. For example, a recent study reported in the New York
Times revealed that most users were unable to distinguish Russian fake news
postings from real political advertisements, although trained online platform
and social media employees might do better.429 Government guidelines for
427
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good corporate citizenship by social media companies and their users would
be a good start to combatting information warfare but would be insufficient
on their own.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects the most hallowed of American freedoms.
However, information warfare has weaponized free speech against us.
Adversaries of the United States have taken advantage of our prized freedom
of speech and used it to undermine our electoral process, the very foundation
of democracy itself. To fight against information warfare, the U.S.
Government is faced with a paradox: while our enemies enjoy and exploit
our citizens’ right to free speech, Congress may need to restrict the freedom
of speech of Americans to fight our enemies’ speech. Congress and
administrative agencies must tread carefully to avoid unduly restricting First
Amendment freedoms in the name of national security. Allowing our
adversaries to enjoy First Amendment freedoms—while Americans truly
cannot—would help our enemies win.
Faced with the enormous challenge of balancing the First Amendment
with national security concerns, the United States has passed little legislation
and issued few regulations to fight information warfare, especially as related
to elections. Several bills to enhance U.S. Government efforts to combat
information warfare are currently stalled in Congress, in part due to concerns
about their lack of adequate procedural and constitutional safeguards.430
Meanwhile, the threat increases, as Russia continues its information warfare
campaigns with unparalleled speed. Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China
are continuing to develop information warfare programs. U.S. inaction to
combat them will likely encourage other foreign governments to engage in
similar influence operations.
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This Article outlines what must be done to reform U.S. laws to fight
information warfare. A whole-of-government approach, involving the
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, the military, the intelligence
community, and other civilian agencies, is necessary to fight it. The work of
these agencies is governed by a patchwork of laws that needs to be reformed,
synthesized, and harmonized with the United States’ commitment to free
speech and other civil liberties. Legal reconceptions of First Amendment
doctrine, privacy, and the role of the Internet and social media in society are
necessary to combat information warfare effectively.
This Article’s analysis of U.S. laws governing information warfare
presents implications for how the U.S. military may conduct information
operations abroad. Military information and cyber operations are covered
by a separate and overlapping legal framework than that discussed above,
reflecting the differing requirements of kinetic warfare, other operations
abroad, the law of armed conflict, international law, and sometimes covert
operations. However, military operations must conform to constitutional
principles and many other domestic laws and policies of the United States.
Even though military operations are within the purview of the Executive
Branch, their constitutional validity may rest on congressional approval or
limitations. The court of public opinion, which is increasingly important in
military operations, is also concerned with constitutional liberties.
Furthermore, military information operations may produce collateral
effects that affect U.S. nationals and involve the functioning of online
platforms, especially if they are subject to a cyber intrusion.431 Perhaps most
importantly, military operations increasingly rely on a whole-of-government
approach, in which the military works closely with other government
agencies to coordinate a unified fight against a foreign adversary. Thus, the
analysis above may be useful to the DOD in planning future military efforts
to fight information warfare.
The information warfare threat leads to a clash between two values that
are fundamental to American society: freedom of speech and free-and-fair
elections. Both ideals are grounded in the First Amendment, which has
traditionally protected political speech above all forms of expression. The
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environment in which political speech is made and received is vastly different
from the original Millian conception of the marketplace of ideas. So much
speech now floods the marketplace that little can be heard at all. Some
speakers can shout more loudly and rapidly than others due to
mechanization. Shopper-listeners lock themselves in echo chambers
alongside only customers of similar views. The flood of so much information
into the marketplace at once, plus the poor acoustic conditions, make it
difficult for true speech to be heard over falsities.
In this new speech environment, courts should be more concerned with
the validity and intent of political speech than the availability of that speech.
Deciding what speech is and what speech is not “political” is dangerous
territory for the government. Instead, legislators and courts should take a
narrower approach, focusing on speech made by foreign individuals and
foreign agents in the electoral context. They can also act to protect the
fundamental constitutional right to vote and the electoral process that
surrounds it. Just as importantly, courts can recognize social media
companies for the unique entities that they are: part press, part service
provider, and part corporate governance entity. Legislators may also
regulate social media companies accordingly.
Besides intelligence collection, more academic research on information
warfare is desperately needed to make the combat effort effective. Research
is needed to understand the nature of information warfare, to predict how it
will develop, and to develop countertactics and operations accordingly.
Fourth Amendment concerns with protecting Americans against
unreasonable search and seizure must also be fully explored. Experiments
are needed to determine what tactics will work to fight information warfare,
and under which conditions. Research is also necessary to determine who is
susceptible to information warfare. Academics, government, and social
media providers must cooperate to achieve a holistic picture of the
information battlefield. Further research is critical to assess the impact of
disinformation campaigns on U.S. elections. Without clarifying the extent
or nature of the harm caused by disinformation campaigns, government
agencies may find it difficult to attract resources or develop effective
programs to combat the threat.
Disinformation threatens the existence of a well-informed public, and
therefore, democracy itself. As Justice Robert Jackson aptly noted, the
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Constitution should not be “a suicide pact.”432 Likewise, the United States
should not fall on the First Amendment’s double-edged sword. The time has
come for courts to reaffirm the primacy of political speech by protecting it
from foreign information operations. Nothing less than the meaning of the
First Amendment, the right to privacy, and the foundations of American
democracy are at stake.
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